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Originalism remains a controversial interpretive method-
ology, but in federalism cases all of the Justices on the 
Rehnquist Court appeared to embrace it. Originalism, of 
course, presupposes that the Constitution has a fixed, original 
meaning. But the nature of a constitution, Chief Justice John 
Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, requires that 
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects 
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those ob-
jects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.1 To 
Marshall, this was one of the Constitutions great virtues.2 But 
others saw vice. During the debate over whether to ratify the 
Constitution, Anti-Federalists charged that the Constitution 
was deliberately ambiguous, and that judges, acting under the 
guise of constitutional interpretation, would construe it in-
strumentally to permit expansive federal power.3 Federalists 
responded by arguing that the Constitution was a straightfor-
ward charter, and to the extent that itlike all written docu-
mentscontained ambiguities, they would be resolved by 
judges constrained by the rules of universal jurisprudence 
and traditional methods of interpretation.4 Like any other new 
law[], Madison explained, the Constitution would be obscure 
and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated and ascertained 
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.5 
Federalist advocates of ratification and Anti-Federalist op-
ponents thus generally agreed that the Constitutions generali-
ties would sometimes be given particular meaning in the course 
 
 1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 2. To Marshall, the alternative was not feasible: A constitution, to con-
tain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will 
admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, 
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced 
by the human mind. Id. Worse still, a governing charter that dealt too inti-
mately with details would probably never be understood by the public. Id. 
 3. See infra notes 4557 and accompanying text. 
 4. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1937) [hereinaf-
ter ELLIOTS DEBATES] (remarks of John Steele at the 1788 North Carolina 
convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961); see infra notes 6271 and accompanying text. 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
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of judicial decision making, even if they disagreed about 
whether this was a cause for concern. This early understand-
ingthat the Constitutions meaning could be fixed through 
postratification practiceenables originalists to reconcile the 
theory that the Constitutions meaning cannot perpetually 
evolve with the reality that the Constitution and the historical 
materials to which we look today to discern original meaning 
may in fact leave many important questions unresolved.6 Even 
if the meaning of a constitutional provision was not fully set-
tled at the time of ratification, it could be fixed by precedent, 
and the originalist today is as bound by that fixed meaning as 
he would be by the meaning of constitutional provisions that 
were unambiguous upon ratification. 
In the first decade of the new republic, the most significant 
constitutional questions were addressed, albeit not always re-
solved, in the political branches.7 But the Court had many op-
portunities to liquidate the meaning of the Constitution dur-
ing John Marshalls thirty-four-year tenure as Chief Justice. In 
the words of David Currie, [t]he Court under Marshall had a 
unique opportunity to put meat on the largely bare bones of the 
Constitution.8 The most significant opinions during Marshalls 
tenure represented a vigorous affirmation of national author-
ity and of vigorous enforcement of constitutional limitations on 
the states.9 His Court announced a sweeping view of Con-
 
 6. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 55556 (2003) (discussing several questions on which mem-
bers of the founding generation disagreed and which remain unclear today). 
 7. The most prominent examples are the debate over whether Congress 
has power to create a national bank, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION 
IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 17891901, at 3641 (1997), whether 
the President has inherent authority to remove an executive officer, see id. at 
7880, and whether the House of Representatives has authority to decline to 
appropriate funds for the execution of a treaty, see id. at 21122. The Court 
did issue some important decisions during that time. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 39394 (1798) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits only retroactive criminal laws); Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 23637 (1796) (holding that the Court had authority 
to invalidate a state law for unconstitutionality); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 419, 425 (1793) (holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear an 
original action in assumpsit against the State). But for the most part, [i]n the 
twelve years of its existence before the appointment of John Marshall as Chief 
Justice, the Supreme Court had decided few significant constitutional ques-
tions. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 127 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, SUPREME COURT]. 
 8. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 6263. 
 9. Id. at 62. 
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gresss incidental powers under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, in the course of upholding the legality of the Bank of 
the United States;10 first suggested the existence of a dormant 
Commerce Clause as a limitation on state regulatory author-
ity;11 affirmed the Courts authority to review state court deci-
sions denying federal rights;12 asserted federal jurisdiction over 
suits against state officers;13 broadly construed Article III fed-
eral question jurisdiction;14 and narrowly construed the States 
immunity from suit in federal court.15 
The Marshall Courts assertive nationalism poses a chal-
lenge to the modern originalist. Justice Scalia, for example, has 
repeatedly asserted that the Constitution should be interpreted 
as it was understood when it was drafted and ratified,16 and 
has criticized those who have interpreted it according to the dif-
ferent meaning that subsequent generations have ascribed to 
it.17 However, as I have recently explained, Justice Scalias 
opinions in federalism cases make clear that his understanding 
of the original understanding rests more heavily on the views of 
founding-era Anti-Federalists than on the views of the more 
nationalist Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton or James 
Wilson.18 
What, then, is Justice Scalia to make of the decisions of the 
Marshall Court, many of which were in tension with the more 
narrow view of federal authority that found currency among 
Anti-Federalists at the time of the ratification, and among Jef-
 
 10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 11. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3747 (1824). 
 12. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 41011 (1821); Martin v. 
Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 32731 (1816). 
 13. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 867 
(1824). 
 14. Id. at 738. 
 15. Id. at 84758; Cohens, 19 U.S. at 40512. 
 16. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849, 854 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism]. 
 17. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 
4445 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts]; 
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 854. 
 18. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Courts Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 21721 (2004); 
see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997); Blatchford v. 
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 77986 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 2945 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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fersonian Republicans at the time of Marshalls tenure on the 
Court? After all, the original understanding appears to have 
been that the answers to questions left unresolved by the Con-
stitution, or not anticipated at the time of ratification, could be 
fixed in the course of subsequent adjudications. Moreover, Jus-
tice Scalia himself appears to have embraced this understand-
ing as a way to reconcile the theory that the Constitution has 
an unvarying, fixed meaning with the reality that the Constitu-
tion was, at least at the founding, filled with ambiguity.19 To 
the extent that the significant questions addressed by the Mar-
shall Court truly had been obscure and equivocal20 at the 
time of the ratification, the Marshall Courts resolution of those 
questions supplied a fixed meaning. 
The decisions of the Marshall Court pose a dilemma for the 
modern originalist. Discounting the significance of Marshall 
Court decisionsin order to declare an original understanding 
that is more solicitous of the views of framing-era opponents of 
the Constitutionrisks infidelity to the original understanding 
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. However, 
accepting the nationalist implications of decisions of the Mar-
shall Court, and thus remaining faithful to the original under-
standing of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, 
risks undervaluing the views of Anti-Federalists in the quest to 
define the original understanding. 
Originalism thus appears to tug the originalist in two op-
posite directions. On the one hand, an originalist who, like Jus-
tice Scalia, believes that the Constitution was not originally 
understood to confer broad power on the federal government, 
can discount the nationalistic decisions of the Marshall Court 
on the ground that they are simply inconsistent with the origi-
nal understanding.21 In other words, the originalist can assert 
that the questions resolved by the Marshall Court were in fact 
not left obscure and equivocal by the Constitution, and that 
the Marshall Court simply answered them in a manner incon-
sistent with the original understanding. The originalist who 
takes this view must still decide whether to follow decisions of 
 
 19. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (Because there is no constitutional 
text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [plaintiffs] challenge 
must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of 
the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.); Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. at 2945 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
 21. See infra notes 22538 and accompanying text. 
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the Marshall Court, but only because of the command of stare 
decisis, not because of the command of originalism itself. 
On the other hand, the originalist who is skeptical of broad 
federal power may nevertheless be compelled by originalism it-
self to accept even the expansively nationalistic decisions of the 
Marshall Court. To the extent that one cannot plausibly argue 
that all of the questions addressed by that Court were clear at 
the time of the ratification, the original understanding appears 
to demand the conclusion that the answers to those questions 
and any others necessary to the reasoning were fixed by the 
Marshall Courts decisionseven if they would have been re-
solved differently had, say, Roger Taney or Salmon Chase been 
Chief Justice rather than John Marshall. 
How did the members of the Rehnquist Court actually 
treat the decisions of the Marshall Court in federalism cases? 
For this Article, I reviewed every federalism decision since 
1970 to determine whether the Justices who generally consti-
tuted the majority in federalism cases treated decisions of the 
Marshall Court differently than did the frequent dissenters in 
such cases.22 I considered both the frequency of citation to Mar-
shall Court decisions and, in those instances in which there 
were references to Marshall Court decisions, the purpose for 
which the decision was cited. When the Justices did cite deci-
sions of the Marshall Court, I attempted to consider both the 
substantive points of law for which the decisions were cited and 
the fidelity of the use of the decision to the original implication 
of the Marshall Court opinion. 
The study reveals that in federalism cases, the Justices in 
the majority were significantly more likely than the dissenters 
to ignore federalism decisions of the Marshall Court altogether, 
whereas the dissenters were far more likely to premise argu-
ments about the original understanding on Marshall Court de-
cisions. When the Justices of the majority did rely on Marshall 
Court decisions, they were substantially more likely than the 
dissenters to cite qualifying statements about the limited scope 
of federal authority. The dissenters, in contrast, were consid-
erably more likely to rely on the more expansive nationalistic 
implications of Marshall Court decisions. 
The results of the study demonstrate that the Justices, 
while professing fidelity to the principles of originalism, did not 
robustly, or at least consistently, adhere to the original under-
 
 22. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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standing of how constitutional ambiguities would attain fixed 
meaning through adjudication. More important, the study has 
implications for originalism as a methodology of constitutional 
interpretation. Proponents of originalism contend that original-
ism minimizes the risk of judicial instrumentalism more effec-
tively than other methods of constitutional interpretation.23 
The study suggests, however, that this justification for original-
ism is overstated. By relying explicitly or implicitly on the 
vague distinction between holdings and dicta to temper (or in-
vigorate) the doctrine of constitutional ambiguities, a Justice 
can ignore (or accept) pronouncements of the Marshall Court 
according to how well they correspond to the Justices own con-
ception of the original understanding or to the Justices own in-
strumentalist goals. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the context, 
by providing an overview of originalism as an interpretive 
methodology, and then explaining ratification-era views of how 
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. Part II provides a 
brief history of Marshalls elevation to the Court and of the 
Courts federalism decisions during his tenure. It then presents 
the findings of the study, which show that there is a demon-
strable difference in how the members of the federalism major-
ity and the dissenters treated decisions of the Marshall Court. 
Finally, Part III addresses some of the implications of the dis-
agreement over the extent of the binding force of decisions of 
the Marshall Court. 
I.  ORIGINALISM AND THE ORIGINAL  
UNDERSTANDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY 
The Rehnquist Court led a federalism revival, often (albeit 
by a narrow majority) favoring the States over the federal gov-
ernment in disputes involving the Constitutions allocation of 
authority.24 Although the Court did not follow one consistent 
 
 23. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863; see also Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 4147. 
 24. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas typically voted to uphold claims of state sovereignty, and Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer generally dissented. Indeed, federalism 
cases decided by the Rehnquist Court after Justice Breyers appointment most 
often produced this identical line-up in 5-4 decisions against the challenged 
assertion of federal power. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Commn v. S.C. State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. 
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methodology in deciding federalism cases, it often employed 
originalism in seeking to resolve contemporary problems of fed-
eralism. To appreciate the role of decisions of the Marshall 
Court in conducting such an inquiry, it is necessary to under-
stand both originalism and the various original understandings 
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. 
A. ORIGINALISM AS A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that 
assigns dispositive weight to the original understanding of the 
Constitution or the constitutional provision at issue. Original-
ism requires that a provision of the Constitution be interpreted 
as it was understood when it was drafted and ratified, not ac-
cording to the different meanings that subsequent generations 
have ascribed to it. Originalism therefore requires reference to 
framing- or ratification-era understandings to determine the 
meaning of the Constitution today.25 
 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). How-
ever, there were some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. 
Ct. 2195 (2005) (Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that Congress has power to regulate the 
purely local cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana); Tennessee v. Lane, 
541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Justice OConnor joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer in holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
validly abrogated the states sovereign immunity); Nev. Dept of Human Res. 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice OConnor 
joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the 
Family and Medical Leave Act validly abrogates the states sovereign immu-
nity); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Justice Ken-
nedy joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the 
states lack power to restrict the number of terms federal representatives may 
serve). The pattern of 5-4 decisions was substantially the same during the first 
eight years of William H. Rehnquists tenure as Chief Justice. See, e.g., Blatch-
ford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452 (1991); Welch v. Tex. Dept of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 
(1987). The only notable exceptions before Justice Breyers appointment were 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which Justice White 
cryptically joined a plurality of four Justices to hold that Congress had author-
ity pursuant to the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states sovereign immu-
nity, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which Justice 
Souter added a sixth vote in favor of the States claim. The Court overruled 
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
 25. This description of originalism may be deceptively simple, as there is 
disagreement among originalists over the role of constitutional text, Framer 
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Of course, as the most prominent adherents of the view 
concede, [t]here is plenty of room for disagreement as to what 
original meaning was, and even more as to how that original 
meaning applies to the situation before the court.26 In addi-
tion, although some originalists appear to seek answers to con-
stitutional questions by simply asking, How would the origi-
nals have answered this question then?,27 more nuanced 
approaches to originalism aim to preserve original meaning, 
not just in the original context but as applied in the current con-
text,28 through a process of what Lawrence Lessig has called 
translation.29 At bottom, however, originalists agree that the 
meaning of the Constitution does not change to suit modern 
preferences; its contemporary meaning is its original meaning. 
The principal conventional defenses of originalism fall into 
two categories: social-contractarian defenses and judicial-
constraint defenses. The social-contractarian defenses hold 
that judges may displace legislative decisions in the name of 
the Constitution, but only because the Constitution is a social 
contract to which consent was validly given through ratifica-
tion.30 Contractarian views, in turn, imply original-
ist . . . interpretation by the judicial branch, because it would 
be impossible to enforce the bargain struck by the people with-
out reference to their understanding of the bargain.31 
 
intent, and other arguably relevant considerations. See Richard S. Kay, 
Originalist Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POLY, 335, 33640 (1996); Smith, supra note 18, at 22628. 
 26. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 45; accord ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
163 (1990). 
 27. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 
(1993). Lessig refers to this approach as one-step fidelity, and cites the writ-
ings of Robert Bork as an example. See id. at 1183 (citing BORK, supra note 26, 
at 144). This approach fails, Lessig argues, because although sensitive to the 
effects of context upon meaning in the original context, it is blind to the effects 
of context upon the application meaning in the application context. Id. at 
1189. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 1173; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: 
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396401 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, 
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 144
68; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 14062 (1991); 
Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 67 (1998). 
 30. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997). 
 31. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1998); see also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism 
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The judicial-constraint defenses of originalism posit that 
only originalist methodology effectively limits the ability of un-
elected judges to impose their own views under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation. Stated simply, if constitutional 
meaning is fixed by an understanding ascertainable by conven-
tional historiographic methodsin contrast to an approach un-
der which constitutional meaning is subject to evolving, extra-
textual normsunelected judges cannot impose their own 
views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.32 
Justice Scalia has argued that the main danger in judicial 
interpretation . . . is that the judges will mistake their own 
predilections for the law, and that [n]onoriginalism, which 
under one or another formulation invokes fundamental values 
as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this 
weakness.33 Proponents of originalism concede that often it is 
difficult to achieve consensus on what the original understand-
 
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132 
(1998). Social-contractarian defenses rely heavily on democratic theory. Pro-
ponents argue that originalism is faithful to both the legitimately and democ-
ratically expressed aspirations of the founding generation, see BORK, supra 
note 26, at 143; McConnell, supra, at 1132, and current expressions of majority 
will through democratic processes, see BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, 
Originalism, supra note 16, at 862. For criticisms of the social-contractarian 
defenses of originalism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 1315 (1991); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Un-
derstanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 230 (1980); Dorf, supra note 30, at 1796
800; Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 109799 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwrit-
ten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 71014 (1975); Stephen R. Munzer & 
James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1977); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Mil-
lennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 110810 (1998). For a response to these 
critiques of originalism, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Inten-
tions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. 
U. L. REV. 226, 227 (1988). 
 32. See BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra 
note 17, at 4147; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863; see generally 
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS DESIGN 920 (1987) (surveying 
the evolution of the concept of original intention and its role in limiting the 
scope of judicial review). The social-contractarian and judicial-constraint de-
fenses are obviously related. Originalists contend that originalism is the only 
method of constitutional interpretation that is consistent with the notion that 
the Constitution is a form of law, albeit a special kind of law. Like any other 
law, the Constitution has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual 
devices familiar to those learned in the law. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 
16, at 854; see also BORK, supra note 26, at 143; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST 3 (1980). 
 33. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863. 
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ing was;34 but they argue that the practical defects of original-
ism are defects more appropriate for the task at handthat is, 
less likely to aggravate [this] most significant weakness of the 
system of judicial review.35 The originalist at least knows 
what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text, not 
some broader and more amorphous notion grounded in the 
judges own views of justice and morality.36 
Originalism continues to spark a lively debate in the acad-
emy, and the literature is rich with criticisms of the approach.37 
On the Court, however, the originalists appear to have pre-
vailed, at least in federalism cases.38 The Rehnquist Court of-
ten decided federalism cases by narrow 5-4 majorities,39 but the 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent rarely was 
over methodology; instead, the debates tended to be over what 
the original understanding actually was. To be sure, some dis-
senting Justices occasionally suggested other methods of identi-
fying the boundaries between federal and state power.40 On the 
 
 34. See BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 
863. 
 35. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863. 
 36. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 45. For critiques of the 
judicial constraint defense, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE USES OF HISTORY 2528 (1969); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 498500 (1981); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the 
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13
24 (1986); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13, 156; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 31, at 103233; Paul 
L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitu-
tional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963); Smith, supra note 18, at 281
86. 
 37. In addition to the criticisms specific to the social-contractarian and 
judicial-constraint defenses, a frequent attack on originalism is that it pur-
ports to assign clear meaning to a document that is indeterminate with re-
spect to many questions, particularly at a high level of specificity. See JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 10 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 115, 122; Paul Finkelman, The 
Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analy-
sis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 35255 (1989); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of 
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 
69598 (1991); Smith, supra note 18, at 28486. 
 38. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); id. at 760814 (Souter, 
J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); id. at 76100 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 10085 (Souter, J., dissenting); U.S. Term Lim-
its, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); id. at 845926 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
 39. See supra note 24. 
 40. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 97677 (1997) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (discussing European views of federalism). 
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whole, however, the debate in the Courts later federalism cases 
was waged on originalist terms. The consensus on the Court 
about the propriety of originalism in federalism cases provides 
an opportunity to assess how originalism has been deployed in 
practice. 
B. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMBIGUITIES WOULD BE RESOLVED 
1. Fixing Constitutional Meaning 
Even originalisms stoutest advocates concede that it is 
easier to state the originalists task than to perform it.41 The 
difficulty stems in large part from the nature of the framing 
and ratification of the Constitution. The Constitution proposed 
by the delegates to the Philadelphia convention directly ad-
dressed many of the thorny issues that had threatened the con-
vention with failure.42 In part due to the documents focus on 
lofty questions of government structure, however, the drafters 
left ambiguous the answers to many other important questions 
that were sure to arise in the young republic. For the system to 
function and endure, there would have to be some means of as-
cribing meaning to the Constitution where its text otherwise 
was silent or ambiguous. 
There is an obvious tension between the theory of original-
ism, which holds that the Constitution has fixed meaning that 
courts are bound to respect, and the reality of the framing, 
which produced a document rife with indeterminacy. To ad-
dress this tension, originalists have looked to James Madisons 
theory of liquidation of constitutional meaning. As Caleb Nel-
son recently argued, the originalist can accommodate theory to 
reality by accepting the conventional account that the Constitu-
tion, to the extent that it was ambiguous, would attain fixed 
meaning, in James Madisons words, by a series of particular 
 
 41. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, 
supra note 17, at 45. 
 42. For example, the proposed Constitution guaranteed the states equal 
representation in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; rejected Madi-
sons proposal of a congressional power to negative state laws (and a proposal 
to authorize coercive military force to resolve conflicts between state and fed-
eral law), preferring instead contingent supremacy for federal statutes, see id. 
art. VI, cl. 2; and prohibited Congress from abolishing the slave trade before 
1808, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
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discussions and adjudications.43 As explained below, by this 
Madison summed up the view that constitutional ambiguities 
could be resolved through the basic experience of governing in a 
constitutional republicin Congress, in public debate, and in 
the courts. To the extent that the Constitution was ambiguous, 
Madison hoped that its meaning ultimately would be settled 
by precedents.44 
Relying on Madisons theory is particularly compelling for 
the originalist, because the ratification debates suggest some-
thing of a consensus (at least between the warring Federalist 
and Anti-Federalist camps) that case-by-case adjudication in 
the courts would play a central role in assigning fixed constitu-
tional meaning when the text of the Constitution was ambigu-
ous. The debate was prompted by the proposed Constitutions 
provisions that, if construed broadly or purposively, could re-
sult in expansive authority for the federal government and a 
diminished sphere of authority for the States. In his essays ar-
guing against ratification of the Constitution, the Anti-
Federalist Brutus45 warned that federal judges, exercising 
largely unchecked power, would apply establishedand inher-
ently malleablerules of construction to constitutional ambi-
guities to permit expansive federal authority.46 Brutus warned 
that in exercising this power of construction, the federal courts 
would seize on textual ambiguities to give the Constitution 
such a construction as to extend the powers of the general gov- 
 
 
 43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229; see 
Nelson, supra note 6, at 52729, 556; see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7883 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4. 
 44. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 250 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland 
eds., 1979). 
 45. The Essays of Brutus appeared in the New York Journal between Oc-
tober 1787 and April 1788, during which time the first seventy-seven papers of 
The Federalist also appeared, and they were widely reprinted and referred 
to. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
[hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST]. 
 46. Brutus reasoned that Article IIIs extension of the federal judicial 
power to cases arising under the Constitution, and its conferral of equity ju-
risdiction, would authorize federal courts to construe the limits of federal au-
thority, Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 417, 419, and to do so according to prevailing 
rules of construction, which would empower them to explain the 
[C]onstitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to 
the words or letter, id.; see also Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 6, 1788, 
reprinted in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 437, 440. 
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ernment, as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to 
the destruction, of that of the respective states.47 
First, Brutus argued, federal judges would naturally favor 
the government that they served.48 Second, the Constitution 
provided virtually no checks on the power of federal judges.49 
Third and most important, Brutus asserted, the proposed Con-
stitution was filled with provisions that virtually invited fed-
eral judges to declare that federal power was limitless. Most of 
the provisions that convey powers of any considerable impor-
tance, Brutus maintained, are conceived in general and in-
definite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which 
require long definitions to unfold the extent of their mean-
ing.50 Federal judges inevitably would rely on these provi-
sionsincluding the Arising Under Clause in Article III,51 the 
Preamble,52 the Necessary and Proper Clause,53 and the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause54to construe the Constitution to abolish 
 
 47. Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 422, 422. 
 48. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420
21. 
 49. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 437, 437. Brutus assumed that Congress would 
have no power of correction over decisions of the Supreme Court construing 
the Constitution. See Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra 
note 46, at 420; Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, supra note 47, at 
423. Brutus further assumed that in any event, federal judges would effec-
tively control the extent of congressional power over them, by virtue of their 
power to declare Acts of Congress void for inconsistency with the Constitution. 
See Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra, at 440, 442. The 
problem was particularly acute, Brutus argued, because of Article IIIs protec-
tions for judicial tenure and salary. Id. at 439. 
 50. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420
21. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 419. 
 52. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, 
supra note 47, at 424 ([I]t is obvious [the Preamble] has in view every object 
which is embraced by any government.); Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
leaves the legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is 
best). 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 
7, 1788, supra note 47, at 425 (arguing that the General Welfare Clauses 
most natural and grammatical reading is to authorise the Congress to do 
any thing which in their judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare, 
and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers of legis-
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entirely the state governments, and to melt down the States 
into one entire government.55 
Brutus did not go so far as to argue that the courts would 
engage in a transparent power-grab. The more likely course, he 
argued, was that judges would extend the limits of the general 
government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to acco-
modate [sic] themselves to the temper of the people.56 His ul-
timate prediction nevertheless was dire: The judicial power 
will operate to effect . . . an entire subversion of the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers of the individual states.57 
More important for present purposes, Brutuss polemics 
reveal that he assumed that courts would construe the Consti-
tution in the same manner that they construed statutes. For 
Brutus, this was a reason to oppose ratification, because a court 
applying the rules laid down for construing a law58 to the 
Constitution would surely engage in mischief. In Brutuss view, 
a constitution should be a simple compact of a people with 
their rulers, with the power of construction vested in the leg-
islature; if the rulers break the compact, the people have a 
right and ought to remove them and do themselves justice.59 
But the proposed Constitution was not such a simple compact, 
Brutus argued, and its meaning would inevitably be deter-
mined by federal judges. Although Brutus was perhaps the 
most articulate voice among the Constitutions opponents, other 
prominent Anti-Federalists shared his view that the Constitu-
tion was filled with ambiguities60 and that those ambiguities 
 
lation in all cases). 
 55. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 441; 
accord Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, supra note 47, at 424. 
 56. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 441. 
 57. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420; 
see also id. at 422 (This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the 
government, into almost any shape they please.). Brutuss critique thus fo-
cused on the two principal Anti-Federalist articles of faith: that the Constitu-
tion effected too great a consolidation of power in the national government, 
and that the Constitution was fundamentally antidemocratic. See GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 520 (1969); 
Smith, supra note 18, at 239. 
 58. See Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 
419. 
 59. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 442. 
 60. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 134 
(1964) (quoting remarks of Smilie at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2 
ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 4, at 243 (remarks of Smith at the New York 
convention); 4 id. at 187 (remarks of Caldwell at the first North Carolina con-
vention); id. at 70 (Galloway at the first North Carolina convention); id. at 242 
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would be resolved by judges applying the principles of construc-
tion generally applied to statutes.61 
The Federalists responded by arguing that although the 
proposed Constitution hadquite remarkablyproduced 
agreement on a wide range of divisive issues,62 some ambiguity 
was inevitable.63 Such ambiguity was no more fatal for a Con-
stitution, Madison and Hamilton argued, than it was for a 
statute. Indeed, [a]ll new laws, though penned with the great-
est technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by 
a series of particular discussions and adjudications.64 Accord-
 
(resolution of the first North Carolina convention); id. at 34, 50 (Bloodworth at 
the first North Carolina convention); id. at 54, 65, 68 (Spencer at the first 
North Carolina convention); 3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PRO-
CEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
164 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 18271830) [hereinafter ELLIOTS DEBATES (1827 
ed.)] (remarks of Bloodworth at the first North Carolina convention); Letters of 
Centinel No. 2, FREEMANS J. (Philadelphia), 1787, reprinted in 2 ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 143, 147. 
 61. See 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES (1827 ed.), supra note 60, at 164 (remarks of 
Bloodworth at the first North Carolina convention); HERBERT STORING, WHAT 
THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 54 (1981); Address of a Minority of the 
Maryland Ratifying Convention, MD. GAZETTE, May 6, 1788, reprinted in 5 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 92, 95; Essays by Cincinnatus No. 2, 
N.Y.J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 10, 12; 
Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 1788), reprinted in 15 
JOHN P. KAMINSKI & GASPARE J. SALADINO, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 263, 265 (1984); Letters from the 
Federal Farmer No. 4, COUNTRY J. (Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Oct. 12, 1787, re-
printed in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 245, 248; The Address and 
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their 
Constituents, PA. PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 
3 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 145, 15457. 
 62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 230 
(The real wonder is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted, 
and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have 
been unexpected.). 
 63. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 
49193; THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 22729; 
accord Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), supra 
note 44, at 250 (explaining that the exposition of the Constitution would be a 
copious source of interpretive difficulties until its meaning on all great 
points shall have been settled by precedents); see also 1 ELLIOTS DEBATES 
(1827 ed.), supra note 60, at 115 (remarks of Theophilus Parsons at the Mas-
sachusetts convention) ([N]o compositions which men can pen, could be 
formed, but what would be liable to the same charge [of ambiguity].); 
RAKOVE, supra note 37, at 15859. 
 64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229; see id. 
NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 150; id. NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 468; 
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ing to the Federalist defense of the proposed Constitution, 
when ambiguities demanded resolution, intervening experi-
ence would provide the foundation for determining the course 
that the interpretation or revision of the Constitution should 
then take.65 
Madison and Hamilton believed that courts wouldand 
ought toconstrue the Constitution according to the same 
principles of interpretation on which they relied to construe 
statutes. Their view was a restatement in somewhat abstract 
terms of the old common law assumption, shared by the Phila-
delphia Framers, that the intent of any legal document is the 
product of the interpretive process and not some fixed meaning 
that the author locks into the documents text at the outset.66 
In this sense, the Federalist defense of the Constitution was no 
different than the Anti-Federalist critique; Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists agreed that the courts would construe the 
Constitution in the same manner that they construed statutes, 
and that in the process the courts would fix the meaning of am-
biguous constitutional provisions. 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed, however, over 
the desirabilityor at least acceptabilityof judicial interpre-
tation of the Constitution. The Federalists argued that Brutuss 
account of the dangers of judicial construction of the Constitu-
tion was hyperbolic. First, Federalists argued that [t]he rules 
of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by 
the courts in the construction of the laws . . . . In relation to [a 
constitution of government], the natural and obvious sense of 
its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true crite-
rion of construction.67 There thus was little reason to fear, as 
 
id. NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), at 491. 
 65. RAKOVE, supra note 37, at 160; see also Philip A. Hamburger, The 
Constitutions Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 30612 
(1989). Even more ambivalent defenders of the Constitution were willing to 
overlook the problem of constitutional ambiguity. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 
60, at 157 (noting that at the Virginia ratifying convention, Edmund Randolph 
observed, My objection is, that the [Necessary and Proper Clause] is ambigu-
ous, and that that ambiguity may injure the states. . . . But, sir, are we to re-
ject [the Constitution], because it is ambiguous in some particular instances? 
. . . [I]ts adoption is necessary to avoid the storm which is hanging over Amer-
ica . . . .). 
 66. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 910 (1985). 
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 496
97; see also 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 4, at 71 (remarks of John Steele at 
the first North Carolina convention) (Is it not a maxim of universal jurispru-
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Brutus did, that the courts would find in the Constitution any-
thing shocking or surprising to the ordinary reader.68 
Second, the Federalists, led by Hamilton, addressed the 
Anti-Federalists contention that the federal courts power to 
construe the Constitution is fundamentally antidemocratic. 
Hamilton argued that the Constitution is, in fact, and must be 
regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law, and that it 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as 
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legisla-
tive body.69 It was essential that the courts maintain this 
power of interpretation over both statutes and the Constitution, 
Hamilton argued, because in those cases in which there is an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the in-
tention of the people to the intention of their agents.70 
In other words, the power of the courts to construe the 
Constitution does not suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power; it supposes, rather, only that the power 
of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the 
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that 
of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to 
be governed by the latter rather than the former.71 
Whereas Brutus and the Anti-Federalists feared that in-
terpretation would lead to a federal government of unlimited 
powers, Madison, Hamilton, and the Federalists believed that 
legal interpretation was an inevitableand inevitably innocu-
ousprocess that involved the straightforward application of 
common sense to text. As Jefferson Powell has argued, many 
Anti-Federalists, including Brutus, would have preferred a 
compact in the nature of a contract among the States that left 
 
dence, of reason and common sense, that an instrument or deed of writing 
shall be so construed as to give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done with-
out involving any absurdity?). 
 68. Powell, supra note 66, at 911. 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 467. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 46768. Hamilton also responded to Brutuss contention that 
the real effect of this system of government, will . . . be brought home to the 
feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power. Essays of 
Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 417. The courts, he ar-
gued, would have no influence over either the sword or the purse, and would 
have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judg-
ments. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 465. 
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no room for disagreement over what powers the States had 
ceded; they assumed the validity of the anti-interpretive tradi-
tions equation of construction and corruption.72 But the lead-
ing Anti-Federalists, perhaps because they hoped to generate 
opposition to the Constitution by arguing that if ratified it 
would be construed as a quasi-statute,73 agreed with Madison 
and Hamilton that constitutional ambiguities would be re-
solved through case-by-case judicial interpretation. 
Often it is difficult to discern with confidence the original 
understanding of the Constitution, particularly as applied to a 
specific problem that arises today, because supporters and op-
ponents of ratification offered conflicting accounts of the Con-
stitutions meaning. In such cases, there are several plausible 
accounts of the original understanding.74 In contrast, it is gen-
erally easier to identify an original understanding of questions 
expressed at a higher level of generality.75 That appears to be 
the case here. Federalists and Anti-Federalists were in sub-
stantial agreement about the manner in which constitutional 
ambiguities would be resolved; one can therefore assert, albeit 
with the sort of tentativeness that must accompany any at-
tempt to discern one metaunderstanding from the wealth of 
views expressed during the ratification period, that the original 
understanding of constitutional ambiguities was that they 
would sometimes be addressedand constitutional meaning 
fixedthrough subsequent adjudication. 
2. Qualifications to the Conventional Account 
The risk of oversimplification is great, however, when at-
tempting to discern original meaning. Thus a few important 
qualifications to the conventional account of the original under-
 
 72. See Powell, supra note 66, at 912. 
 73. See id. at 905. 
 74. One approach, which the federalism majority consistently followed, is 
to cite Anti-Federalist concerns about the meaning of the Constitution to dem-
onstrate that the delegates at the state ratification conventions would never 
have voted to ratify the Constitution unless it accommodated those concerns. 
See Smith, supra note 18, at 25962. The other approach is to argue that the 
Constitution was ratified notwithstanding the Anti-Federalists frequently ex-
pressed disapproval of many provisions of the proposed Constitution, and that 
their statements demonstrated their understanding of the Constitution. 
Thus, the originalist can argue, Anti-Federalist fears were realized upon rati-
fication. The dissenters in federalism cases on the Rehnquist Court consis-
tently followed this approach. Id. at 26265. 
 75. See id. at 284. 
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standing of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved 
are in order here. First, many during the framing era believed 
that adjudication was not the only way to resolve constitutional 
ambiguities. Madison, for example, believed that Congresss de-
liberations could liquidate76 and fix meaning as well. During 
the debate over the Presidents power to remove an executive 
officer, for example, Representative Madison acknowledged 
that in the ordinary course of government . . . the exposition of 
the laws and [C]onstitution devolves upon the Judiciary, but 
argued that in deciding the limits of the powers of the several 
departments, none of the branches has more right than an-
other to declare their sentiments on that point.77 Similar sen-
timents appear in the debate over whether Congress has power 
to create a national bank.78 But even the questions about re-
moval and the bank ultimately were answeredif not perma-
nently fixedby judicial determination, even as the courts gave 
deference to the views expressed by the early Congresses.79 
Second, in a series of articles and an important recent 
book, Larry Kramer has disputed the conventional account that 
the Framers believed that constitutional ambiguities would be 
resolved through invocation of the power of judicial review.80 
 
 76. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
 77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (J. Gales ed., 1789) (remarks of Rep. James 
Madison on June 17, 1789); accord id. at 514 (The decision that is at this time 
made [about the Presidents power to remove an executive officer] will become 
the permanent exposition of the Constitution.). 
 78. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791) (remarks of Fisher Ames on 
Feb. 3, 1791) (The Constitution contains the principles which are to govern in 
making laws; but every law requires an application of the rule to the case in 
question.). 
 79. See Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 63031 
(1935) (holding that Congress has the power to restrict the Presidents power 
to remove an official who exercises quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial author-
ity; arguing that the debate in first Congress pertained only to a purely execu-
tive officer); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 11217 (1926) (holding that 
the President enjoys the power to remove executive officers, and relying on the 
first Congresss debate over the removal power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of a law creat-
ing a national bank) (It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity, to as-
sert that a measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and plain 
usurpation, to which the [C]onstitution gave no countenance. These observa-
tions belong to the cause; but they are not made under the impression, that, 
were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the 
[C]onstitution.). 
 80. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, PEOPLE THEM-
SELVES]; Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
632 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:612 
 
Kramer argues that the role of the courts in determining con-
stitutional meaning was understood at the ratification to be 
sharply limited, at least in cases involving the limits of federal 
power.81 He contends that modern originalist accounts of the 
courts roleat least in policing the boundaries of congressional 
authorityare ahistorical, and that the historical record re-
veals instead a strong preference for popular constitutional-
ism,82 under which ultimate interpretive authority remained 
with the people.83 
Kramer does not deny that an idea of judicial review had 
already emerged before the Constitution was adopted; he con-
tends, rather, that the practice that emerged in the 1780s was 
not yet well-established or fully developed and, to the extent it 
had proponents, was different in kind from what commentators 
today . . . mean when they talk about judicial review.84 Kramer 
acknowledges the colloquy between Brutus and Publius, as the 
pseudonymous author of The Federalist, about the role of the 
courts in liquidating constitutional meaning, but Kramer ar-
gues that it was not representative of popular sentiment at the 
time of the ratification.85 Kramer also recognizes that the 
Framers understood that a written charter would contain am-
biguities and uncertainties and that these would need to be au-
thoritatively resolved.86 He contends, however, that 
Americans at the Founding also believed that such questions could, 
and should, be settled by popular and political means, even though 
this might entail periods during which some questions of constitu-
tional meaning could remain unsettled and subject to ongoing contro-
versy. Permitting judges to resolve legitimate disagreements about 
the meaning of the Constitution would have violated core principles of 
republicanism, which held that such questions could only be settled 
by the sovereign people. Disputes over what the Constitution meant, 




(2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Poli-
tics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 
(2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards]; Larry D. Kramer, When 
Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Kramer, 
Lawyers]. 
 81. Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 80, at 232, 240, 28788. 
 82. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 80, at 8; Kramer, We the 
Court, supra note 80, at 16. 
 83. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 49. 
 84. Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 387. 
 85. Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 81, at 24651. 
 86. Id. at 237. 
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at the polls; through a process of petitioning, mobbing, and holding 
extralegal conventions; or by revolutionary violence.87 
It was the people themselvesworking through or re-
sponding to their agents in the governmentwho were respon-
sible for seeing that the Constitution was properly interpreted 
and implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility over 
to judges, Kramer argues, was unthinkable.88 
As I understand Kramers project to have evolved,89 it is 
not to deny any role to the courts in construing the Constitution 
and resolving ambiguities, even in federalism cases. As he con-
cedes, the Framers apparent view that politics could settle 
constitutional controversies was naïve, and courts are, particu-
larly by modern standards, a natural choice to determine con-
stitutional meaning.90 But there is a world of difference, he 
argues, between judicial supremacy and judicial sover-
eignty.91 Under the former, courts have the last word on con-
stitutional meaning; under the latter, courts have the only 
word.92 Nothing in the doctrine of judicial supremacy, 
Kramer contends, requires denying either that the Constitu-
tion has qualities that set it apart from ordinary law, or that 
these qualities confer legitimate interpretive authority on po-
litical actors as a means of ensuring continued popular input in 
shaping constitutional meaning.93 
There remains substantial controversy over Kramers core 
assertion about the courts limited role in policing the bounda-
ries of Congresss power.94 But even accepting Kramers ac-
 
 87. Id.; see also id. at 257. 
 88. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 1213. 
 89. See Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 388 (conceding that his critics 
are not wrong to say that I have proved something of a moving target, for 
coming to understand the historical origins of judicial review has been an on-
going and unfolding process). 
 90. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 13. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. Kramer also does not purport to be an originalist. See Larry 
Kramer, On Finding (and Losing) Our Origins, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 95, 
10506 (2003) (It makes no sense to address a new problem by resort to an 
original blueprint after the design has been modified many times.). 
 94. See, e.g., Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80 at 38789; see also Norman 
R. Williams, The Peoples Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2004). Compare 
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1980), Jack N. Rakove, Once More Into the Judicial Breach, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 381 (2003), and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), with Larry Alexander & Lawrence 
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count, there is no fundamental inconsistency in asserting that 
the Framers believed that the constitutional ambiguities could 
be resolved either through adjudication or through popular and 
political means. That Madison believed that congressional de-
liberation95 or popular action96 could fix constitutional meaning 
does not mean that he rejected the notion that the courts could 
fix it in appropriate cases, as well. Indeed, his discussion in The 
Federalist No. 37 and in other sources suggests that he saw 
both as viable means of liquidating the meaning of constitu-
tional ambiguities.97 
In any event, at least five Justices appeared unwilling to 
accept Kramers view of judicial review in cases involving chal-
lenges to Congresss authority.98 To those Justicesand per-
haps to the Justices in the dissent, as well99the doctrine of 
judicial review was alive and well in federalism cases. On their 
own terms, then, the Justices appeared to embracealbeit with 
strikingly different degrees of confidence in federalism 
cases100the ratification-era belief that the Court would play a 
 
B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005), Brad-
ford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319 (2003), 
Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1539 (2005), Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the 
Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003), G. Edward 
White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463 
(2003), and John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1311 (1997).  
 95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), re-
printed in 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 4, at 52829; see generally Theo-
dore W. Ruger, A Question Which Convulses a Nation: The Early Republics 
Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 869 
(2004). 
 97. See supra notes 6266 and accompanying text. 
 98. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997); Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 57980 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); id. at 580 (OConnor, J., dissenting). 
 99. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have asserted that 
they are willing to invalidate a statute of Congress on federalism grounds un-
der rational basis scrutiny, even if they seem unwilling to do so under other 
judicially constructed limits. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 638 
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); 
id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.). 
 100. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 61718 (rejecting the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on 
that conducts aggregate effect on interstate commerce because the Constitu-
tion requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (Although Jus-
tice Breyer argues [in dissent] that acceptance of the Governments rationales 
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significant role in construing the Constitution to liquidate 
meaning. And it is on their own terms that I consider their use 
of originalism in deciding federalism cases. 
Third, Gary Lawson and Michael Stokes Paulsen have of-
fered an account of originalism that rejects not only the Madi-
sonian theory of liquidation through adjudication of constitu-
tional ambiguities, but also the use of precedent itself in many 
constitutional cases.101 According to this view, a court can no 
more give force to precedent that incorrectly interpreted the 
Constitution than it could give force to a statute or an executive 
action that is inconsistent with the Constitution. If the Consti-
tution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, Lawson ar-
gues, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to 
prefer the Constitution.102 Indeed, Lawson contends, If the 
Constitution is supreme law, it is supreme over all competing 
sources of law, statutory, judicial, or otherwise.103 If taken se-
riously, this argument would preclude a court today from giv-
ing dispositive effect to an earlier decision in a constitutional 
case when the earlier decision was inconsistent with the origi-
nal meaning as discerned today, notwithstanding Madisons 
 
would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to identify any 
activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.), with Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Courts substantial 
effects analysis is not a factual enquiry, for Congress in the first instance with 
subsequent judicial review looking only to the rationality of the congressional 
conclusion, but one of a rather different sort, dependent upon a uniquely judi-
cial competence), and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (The 
practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments is a paradigm of 
judicial restraint. In judicial review under the Commerce Clause, it reflects 
our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject ex-
pressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legiti-
macy that comes from Congresss political accountability in dealing with mat-
ters open to a wide range of possible choices. (quoting FCC v. Beach 
Commcns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)). 
 101. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare 
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and 
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). 
 102. Lawson, supra note 101, at 2728. 
 103. Id. at 30. Paulsens argument is more modest. He argues that al-
though stare decisis in constitutional adjudication is not unconstitutional, nei-
ther is it constitutionally compelled. Paulsen, supra note 101, at 154351. Ac-
cordingly, he argues that Congress has authority to abrogate stare decisis in 
constitutional cases. Id. at 156799. The upshot of such a statute would be 
that courts would be obliged to overrule a prior interpretation of the Constitu-
tion if persuaded that the prior interpretation was incorrect on the merits. Id. 
at 1538. 
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theory about the liquidation of constitutional meaning through 
adjudication. 
There are serious difficulties with this view. The Constitu-
tion itself confers on federal courts the judicial Power, which 
in light of history and context can reasonably be read to author-
ize reliance on precedent in constitutional adjudication.104 
Wholesale abandonment of the doctrine of stare decisis in con-
stitutional adjudication risks not only upsetting reliance inter-
ests, but also facilitating judicial about-faces that undermine 
public confidence in the legitimacy of the Courts judgments. 
The risk of judicial instrumentalismwhich proponents of 
originalism claim the methodology minimizeslikely would in-
crease absent the constraining force of precedent. The theory 
that constitutional supremacy is inconsistent with a system 
that accords binding force to judicial decisions that departed 
from original meaning. Moreover, it ignores the possibility that 
the Constitution was originally understood to accommodate 
and perhaps embrace the use of precedent in constitutional 
casesand Madisons and Hamiltons account of how constitu-
tional ambiguities would be resolved might be important evi-
dence of such an understanding.105 
Whatever methodological or theoretical defects there may 
be in Lawsons and Paulsens suggestion, for present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that it is not (and surely does not purport 
to be) a valid descriptive account of recent judicial practice. Al-
though Justice Thomas has on occasion suggested a willingness 
to abandon hundreds of years of precedent in constitutional 
 
 104. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Es-
say on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 57781 (2001). 
 105. Lawsons and Paulsens provocative articles are part of a larger debate 
over whether stare decisis and originalism are fundamentally at odds. The 
seminal treatment is Henry P. Monaghans Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Adjudication, in which he considered whether it is possible to be a strict 
originalist when so much of the Courts jurisprudence is inconsistent with the 
original understanding. 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). Monaghan suggested 
that stare decisis can explain the gap. See id. at 74748. He argued that, at 
least in some important cases, it ought to bridge the gap, and that in other 
cases it promotes other values, such as the conception that the law is imper-
sonal. Id. at 75253. Monaghans treatment sparked a lively debate over 
whether originalism is consistent with stare decisis. In addition to Lawsons 
and Paulsens articles, see Dorf, supra note 30, at 180021 (offering an account 
of originalism that is consistent with the use of stare decisis), and Fallon, su-
pra note 104 (arguing that stare decisis enjoys constitutional legitimacy be-
cause it is widely accepted as such and contributes to the cause of reasonable 
justice). 
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cases,106 for the most part the Justices accept the binding force 
of precedent in constitutional cases.107 Indeed, even Justice 
Scalia acknowledges that almost every originalist would adul-
terate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis.108 
The final qualification about the account I present here of 
the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities 
would be resolved relates to the scope of application of the the-
ory of liquidation, and specifically to the famously elusive dis-
tinction between dicta and holdings. Even accepting the ac-
count presented here of the original understanding of how 
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, how much of 
what the Court says in addressing a constitutional question ac-
tually fixes constitutional meaning? The question is particu-
larly important when considering opinions by Chief Justice 
Marshall, given his tendency to resolveor at least offer 
thoughts aboutquestions not necessarily presented in the 
cases before him.109 
One possibility is utterly conventional: only the holding of 
a case can fix the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional pro-
vision; dicta, in contrast, have never been binding in the Anglo-
American judicial tradition, and thus could not fix constitu-
tional meaning. If what Madison, Hamilton, and others had in 
mind in anticipating judicial liquidation of constitutional mean-
ing was simply that the Courts holdings would become binding 
interpretations of the Constitution, then there is nothing par-
ticularly novel about their understandingother than, per-
haps, the suggestion that the courts would in fact have a role to 
 
 106. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564, 61021 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 585602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 107. I say for the most part because the Court has frequently stressed 
that stare decisis is not an inexorable command, particularly in constitu-
tional cases. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 
(1992). 
 108. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861; accord Antonin Scalia, Re-
sponse, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 129, 139 [herein-
after Scalia, Response] (The demand that originalists alone . . . forswear stare 
decisis is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology so 
disruptive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an 
academic exercise and not as a workable prescription for judicial govern-
ance.). 
 109. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 12526 (describing 
Marshalls decisions as being characterized by rhetorical flourish, bare asser-
tion, plentiful dicta, multiple holdings, inattention to favorable precedent, and 
emphasis on the undesirable consequences of an interpretation at variance 
with his own). 
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play in deciding constitutional meaning. But even if Madison 
and Hamilton merely expected that constitutional ambiguities 
gradually would be resolved according to something like the 
common law method, [t]o slight [certain important statements 
in Marshalls] opinions as dicta, though such they were on a 
technical view, is to disregard significant aspects of his labors 
and the way in which constitutional law develops.110 
In any event, it is easier to assert that only holdings fix 
constitutional meaning than it is to distinguish between hold-
ings and dicta in practice. There is substantial agreement on 
the core principle that dicta has persuasive but not binding ef-
fect, largely for the reasons offered by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Cohens v. Virginia.111 The disagreement is definitional: as Mi-
chael Dorf has noted, we would find a consensus for the judg-
ment that everything that is not holding is dictum and every-
thing that is not dictum is holding, but little in a way of a 
substantive definition of either term.112 Most conventional 
definitions of dictastatements that are not necessary to the 
decision in the precedent case or, to use Marshalls language, 
that go beyond the caseare circular, because the very issue 
in many disputed cases . . . is precisely how far the earlier case 
went.113 
Courts and commentators sometimes assert that a state-
ment is dictum if it was not essential to the outcome of the 
case.114 This formulation focuses on the facts and the outcome 
in the precedent case, and asks which facts were material to 
the decision. According to this view, elaborations of legal prin-
ciple that are broader than the narrowest proposition that 
could have decided the case given its particular facts are con-
sidered dicta.115 Although frequently deployed in practice, this 
 
 110. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 217, 221 (1955). 
 111. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399400 (1821) (The question actually before 
the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other 
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to 
the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom com-
pletely investigated.). 
 112. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2004
09, 204041 (1994). 
 113. Id. at 2003. 
 114. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS REASONINGS 26780 
(1964); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 
(1989); Dorf, supra note 112, at 200824; Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the 
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930). 
 115. Michael Dorf offers as an example Chief Justice Rehnquists narrow 
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formulation of the distinction between holdings and dicta has 
serious potential for judicial manipulation to serve instrumen-
talist ends, and often results in a patchwork of precedent that 
provides little guidance to lower courts and potential liti-
gants.116 The competing explanation of the distinction between 
holdings and dicta focuses on the rationale of the precedent 
case. Under this definition, courts are bound by statements 
that form part of the rationale of the decision in the precedent 
case, even if, when viewed from a post hoc perspective, they 
were not technically essential to the result.117 Although this 
formulation of the distinction between holdings and dicta raises 
definitional problems of its ownspecifically, there is no neat 
way to determine the rationale of the precedent decision118 
it is more consistent with the rule of law and a greater obstacle 
to judicial instrumentalism.119 
If one imports the expansive view of what counts as dicta
the facts-and-outcomes approachto the context of liquida-
tion of constitutional ambiguities, then early decisions of the 
Supreme Court correspondingly will be treated as having re-
solved fewer ambiguous questions. If, on the other hand, one 
follows the rationale-focused approach to distinguishing be-
tween holdings and dicta, then early decisions will be treated 
as having addressed and presumably fixed a greater range of 
ambiguities. At a minimum, the distinction between holdings 
and dicta is sufficiently indeterminate that we must be cau-
tious in invoking it as a basis for claims that statements by a 
prior Court are not binding, either as a matter of stare decisis 
or the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities 
would be resolved. 
 
 
treatment of Roe v. Wade in his plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 51721 (1989). See Dorf, supra note 112, at 
200708, 203033. 
 116. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988); 
Alexander, supra note 114, at 20, 2829 ([R]estricting a rule to the facts of 
the precedent case is inconsistent with constraint by precedent.); Dorf, supra 
note 112, at 1999, 2024; Linda Meyer, Nothing We Say Matters: Teague and 
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 45976 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Tak-
ing Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 56 (1979). 
 117. See Alexander, supra note 114, at 3233; Dorf, supra note 112, at 
204048; Monaghan, supra note 105, at 76365; see also Michael Abramowicz 
& Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). 
 118. See, e.g, Alexander, supra note 114, at 18 n.21 (listing sources); Dorf, 
supra note 112, at 2036 nn.14243 (listing sources). 
 119. See Dorf, supra note 112, at 204966. 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
640 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:612 
 
These qualifications suggest that caution, rather than con-
fidence, is warranted in asserting that the original understand-
ing was that constitutional ambiguities would be resolved by 
the Court, which would offer fixed meaning in the course of 
case-by-case adjudication. The Court itself, however, appears to 
have accepted this account of the original understanding of how 
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, by applying an 
originalist methodology to constitutional interpretation (at 
least in federalism cases) while following the doctrine of stare 
decisis. At a minimum, the Court often treats decisions of the 
early Court as entitled to great deference because most of the 
Justices of that era participated directly in the ratification de-
bates, and all were members of the founding generation and 
thus in a better position to assess the original understanding 
than a modern-day judge.120 For present purposes, it is the Jus-
tices own understanding of the original understanding that is 
important, because it is against that understanding that we 
can judge their treatment of decisions of the Marshall Court. 
II.  THE MARSHALL COURT, THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
AND FEDERALISM 
It is not difficult to see how, in light of both originalism 
and the original understanding of how constitutional ambigui-
ties would be resolved, decisions of the Marshall Court are 
relevant to answering disputed questions of federalism today. 
Yet therein lies the tension: whereas the Rehnquist Court was 
most often identified with an aggressive defense of state au-
thority, the Marshall Court consistently upheld claims of broad 
federal authority while announcing limits on state power. 
Moreover, the Marshall Courts approach to constitutional in-
terpretation was consistent with Madisons and Hamiltons 
predictions, while simultaneously confirming the Anti-
Federalists fears. As Marshall explained in Gibbons v. Ogden, 
We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, 
other than is given by the language of the instrument which 
 
 120. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 856 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (declining to rely on the views of Joseph Story because 
he was not a member of the Founding generation, and his Commentaries on 
the Constitution were written a half century after the framing. Rather than 
representing the original understanding of the Constitution, they represent 
only his own understanding); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 
(1997) (contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . , ac-
quiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its pro-
visions (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926))). 
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confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which 
they were conferred.121 Marshalls Court often self-consciously 
played the role that Madison envisioned for it, tackling an ob-
scure and equivocal document, liquidat[ing] and ascer-
tain[ing] its meaning in a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications.122 This Part first provides an overview of the 
Marshall Courts important federalism decisions and then pre-
sents the results of a study of the Rehnquist Courts treatment 
of those decisions in federalism cases. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL COURT 
President Washington famously warned in his Farewell 
Address about the dangers of partisanship, but by the time 
Washington left office, the Federalist and Republican parties 
had already become rival political forces.123 The principal point 
of disagreement between the parties was over the extent of the 
powers that the Constitution vested in the national govern-
ment, and derivatively over how strictly to construe the char-
ter. Federalists continued to apply traditional methods of 
statutory construction to the Constitution, which yielded inter-
pretations authorizing broad federal power. In contrast, Repub-
licans, in many ways the intellectual and ideological heirs of 
the Anti-Federalists,124 began to warn that the wiles of con-
struction could be controlled only by a narrow reading of the 
Constitutions expansive language.125 Hamilton, the most elo-
quent voice among the nationalist Federalists, argued that 
sound maxim[s] of construction required that the Constitu-
 
 121. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). 
 122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
 123. The divide was apparent as early as Washingtons first term, when 
Alexander Hamilton served as Secretary of the Treasury and Thomas Jeffer-
son served as Secretary of State. The most celebrated disagreement between 
Hamilton and Jefferson concerned the constitutionality of a national bank. 
Compare Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitu-
tionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791) [hereinafter Hamilton, Opinion] 
(arguing for an expansive definition of federal power), reprinted in 8 PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 11926 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965), with Thomas 
Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791) (arguing 
for a narrow definition of federal power), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 416, 41620 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
 124. See, e.g., 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE 
PRESIDENT 2526 (1970) (noting Jeffersons distrust of government strength); 
Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 
YALE L.J. 1317, 1364 (1982) (noting Jeffersons goal of limited government). 
 125. Powell, supra note 66, at 923. 
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tions affirmative grants of authority be construed liberally.126 
Jefferson, the most cogent voice among the devolutionist Re-
publicans, responded that [t]he States supposed that by their 
tenth amendment they had secured themselves against con-
structive powers.127 
Not all of the Federalists were quite as nationalist as Ham-
ilton. By 1800, President Adams had purged his cabinet of 
Hamiltonians, and in May of that year he appointed John Mar-
shall, whom Adams viewed as ideologically compatible, to be 
Secretary of State.128 But Marshall shared Hamiltons belief 
that a strong national government would be better at the art of 
governing129 and would save popular government and the Revo-
lution from their excesses.130 In October 1800, one month be-
fore the national elections, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth an-
nounced that he planned to resign from the Court because of 
his waning health.131 President Adams nominated Marshall on 
January 20, 1801, and he was confirmed by the Senate on 
 
 126. Hamilton, Opinion, supra note 123, at 105. 
 127. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (June 12, 
1823), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 146, 148 
(Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Gideon Granger (1800), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 30, 
30 (Saul Padover ed., 1939) ([T]he true theory of our Constitution is surely 
the wisest and best, that the States are independent as to everything within 
themselves, and united as to everything respecting foreign nations. Let the 
General Government be reduced to foreign concerns only . . . .). 
Jeffersons critique of constitutional interpretation ultimately became the 
core argument in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which Jefferson and 
Madison (at that point a Republican) wrote to protest the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798. See Powell, supra note 66, at 92427. The resolutions argued 
that the Constitution was a contract among sovereign states, which retained 
ultimate authority to resolve disputes over its meaning and to strike down 
acts of Congress that violated it. See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions 
(Nov. 10, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799) reprinted in 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 4, 
at 540, 54045; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), re-
printed in 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 4, at 528, 52829. 
 128. See R. K. NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 141 (2001). 
 129. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 
17475. 
 130. WOOD, supra note 57, at 517. Serving in the militia during the war 
made Marshall a nationalist, NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 29, and his subse-
quent experience in the Virginia House of Delegates convinced him that the 
legislature was driven largely by parochialism, id. at 28, 39, 42. 
 131. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 THE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 180115, at 103 n.158 
(1981). 
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January 27, after the Republicans had swept the Presidency, 
the House, and the Senate, but before the transfer of power.132 
Strengthening the federal judiciary, since it was the only 
hedge against Republican dominance, was the one subject on 
which the lame-duck Federalists could unite.133 Marshalls 
Supreme Court soon became the Federalists only pocket of re-
sistance to Jeffersonian Republicanism.134 
[F]ate and ambition made Jefferson president and Mar-
shall chief justice, and the two men came to symbolize[] and 
personalize[] the competing constitutional persuasions of the 
age.135 Their most famous conflict was over the events that led 
to, and the decision in, Marbury v. Madison,136 in which Mar-
shall both rebutted Jeffersons earlier argument that the States 
ought to retain ultimate authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion137 and insisted that the executive is bound by the rule of 
law.138 After Marbury, Marshalls Court consistently rejected 
the state-sovereignty and constitutional-compact themes of 
Republican constitutional thought.139 The Court chose instead 
to apply to the Constitution the traditional methods of con-
struction that Madison and Hamilton believed were appropri-
ate and that Anti-Federalist opponents of ratification fre-
quently warned would apply.140 
 
 132. NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 142, 146. 
 133. Id. at 134. The Judiciary Act of 1801, which the Federalists enacted 
before the Republicans took office, created sixteen new federal circuit judge-
ships, expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and reduced the number 
of Supreme Court justices from six to five, effective at the next vacancy. Act of 
Feb. 13, 1801, ch.4, 2 Stat. 89. The Act was repealed by the Republicans in 
1802, see Repeal Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132, but by that time Mar-
shall was already on the bench. 
 134. Powell, supra note 66, at 942. 
 135. NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 147. 
 136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 137. Compare id. at 17778 (It is, emphatically, the province and duty of 
the judicial department, to say what the law is . . . . So, if a law be in opposi-
tion to the [C]onstitution; . . . the court must determine which of these conflict-
ing rules governs the case . . . .), with Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolu-
tions (Nov. 19, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra 
note 4, at 540, 540 ([T]his government, created by this compact, was not made 
the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself . . . ; 
but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common 
judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as 
of the mode and measure of redress.). 
 138. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 17273 (concluding that mandamus may lie 
against the Secretary of State). 
 139. Powell, supra note 66, at 942. 
 140. See supra notes 4571 and accompanying text. 
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Marshall and Jefferson clearly disagreed about matters of 
federalism, as well, but the Marshall Court did not issue its 
most significant decisions on that topic until after Jefferson 
had left office.141 During Marshalls thirty-four-year tenure as 
Chief Justice, his Court addressed a wide range of issues re-
lated to the powers of the state and federal governments. It is 
not my purpose here to explore these decisions in detail, but in-
stead to highlight the most important Marshall Court federal-
ism decisions to provide context for the results of the study.142 
The Marshall Court pledged fidelity to the doctrine of 
enumerated powers,143 but its decisions on the scope of federal 
power expansively defined Congresss incidental authority and 
planted the seeds for later broad constructions of Congresss 
power to regulate interstate commerce. In McCulloch v. Mary-
land,144 the Court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, that Congress has broad incidental powers beyond those 
expressly authorized in Article I.145 The Court also offered a 
broad construction of the sweep of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and held that Congress had power to create a national 
bank.146 In Gibbons v. Ogden,147 the Court, again in an opinion 
by Marshall, defined commerce as all commercial inter-
course, not just the exchange of goods, and thus held that 
Congress has power to license vessels traveling between two 
states.148 Although the Court conceded that the completely in-
ternal commerce of a State . . . may be considered as reserved 
for the State itself,149 it suggested that Congress may regulate 
 
 141. Jefferson appointed three Justices before his second term ended in 
1809, and after 1811, only Marshall and one other JusticeBushrod Washing-
tonwere Federalists. Yet decisions of the Marshall Court were almost al-
ways unanimous and were almost always written by Marshall. See CURRIE, 
SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196. 
 142. For a more exhaustive review, see id. at 61198. 
 143. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 19495 (1824) (conceding 
that the commerce power is limited to that commerce which concerns more 
states than one . . . . The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may 
be considered as reserved for the State itself.); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (conceding that the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers and may exercise only the powers granted to it).  
 144. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 145. Id. at 32426. 
 146. Id. at 422. 
 147. 22 U.S. 1. 
 148. Id. at 18990, 204. 
 149. Id. at 195. 
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commerce that merely extend[s] to or affect[s] other states.150 
This provided a doctrinal basis for the Courts more expansive 
constructions of the Commerce Clause in the twentieth cen-
tury.151 
The Marshall Court was also aggressive in construing con-
stitutional limits on the power of the States. In McCulloch, for 
example, the Court held that the States cannot tax or regulate 
the activities of the federal government, and therefore invali-
dated Marylands tax on the national bank152even though, 
the Court suggested in dicta, state banks would not similarly 
be immune from federal taxation.153 In Gibbons, Marshall sug-
gested that Congresss power to regulate interstate commerce is 
exclusive,154 laying the doctrinal foundation for the dormant 
Commerce Clause.155 
The Marshall Court also narrowly construed the States 
immunity from suit. In Cohens v. Virginia,156 Marshall stated 
that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Supreme 
Court review of suits commenced by States.157 Marshall also 
provided an account of the Eleventh Amendment that is consis-
tent with the narrow diversity theory of the provisions appli-
 
 150. Id. at 194. 
 151. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 11829 (1942) (holding 
that Congress has the power to regulate the growing of wheat for on-farm con-
sumption). 
 152. 17 U.S. 316, 43136. 
 153. Id. at 435. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that whereas a state tax 
imposed on a federal instrumentality falls principally on persons outside the 
stateand thus on persons with no electoral control over state decision mak-
inga federal tax would not impose such externalities, because the states are 
represented in Congress. See id. at 428, 435. The Court later disregarded the 
Chief Justices dicta. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 12627 (1871), over-
ruled in part by Graves v. New York ex rel. OKeefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) 
(permitting nondiscriminatory federal taxation of state government officials 
salaries). 
 154. 22 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 22729 (Johnson, J., concurring) (resting 
decision on ground that federal power to regulate commerce is exclusive). 
Marshall later seemed to retreat from this position. See Willson v. Black-Bird 
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (upholding a state law that 
authorized construction of a dam to obstruct a navigable creek). 
 155. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 104346 
(3d ed. 2000) (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, as expressed in Gibbons). But cf. Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1499 (2004) (arguing that Marshall purposely avoided 
embracing the dormant Commerce Clause because he foresaw the danger of 
allowing the Court to determine such allocations of power). 
 156. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 157. Id. at 40507. 
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cation.158 More sweepingly, he suggested that Article IIIs pro-
vision extending the judicial power to cases arising under fed-
eral law embraces suits involving States, notwithstanding a 
States claim of sovereign immunity.159 In Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States,160 Marshalls opinion for the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state officer, 
in part because a contrary interpretation might impede the en-
forcement of federal law.161 In Bank of the United States v. 
Planters Bank of Georgia,162 the Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar a suit against a corporation in which 
the State is a shareholder.163 Marshalls justifications for this 
conclusionthat the State was not a party, the State was act-
ing in its proprietary capacity, and the State had consented to 
suit by giving the bank the capacity to sue and be sued
suggested broad exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.164 
The Marshall Court also defined the federal judicial power 
expansively. In Martin v. Hunters Lessee,165 one of the few sig-
nificant decisions of the Marshall Court that the Chief Justice 
did not write,166 the Court held that Congress had power to au-
thorize the Supreme Court to review state judgments, and thus 
effectively held that the Court had power to determine the con-
 
 158. See id. at 40607. According to the diversity theory, the Eleventh 
Amendment limited the federal judicial power only when jurisdiction is based 
on the Citizen-State Diversity Clause of Article III. See William Fletcher, The 
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1989); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative 
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment 
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 
193638 (1983). 
 159. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 392. 
 160. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 161. Id. at 84758. 
 162. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). 
 163. Id. at 90608. 
 164. See also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 13941 (1809) 
(enforcing over an Eleventh Amendment defense a decree against representa-
tives of a deceased state treasurer). 
 165. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 166. Justice Story wrote the opinion in Martin after Marshall recused him-
self because he had appeared as counsel in the case before he was on the bench 
and because his family had an interest in the lands at issue. CURRIE, SU-
PREME COURT, supra note 7, at 91. 
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stitutionality of state legislation.167 The Court also suggested 
that Congress is required to authorize such review,168 although 
this view remains highly controversial.169 In Osborn and the 
companion Planters Bank case, the Court held that Congress 
had power to confer jurisdiction over all suits by or against the 
bank,170 because the banks ability to contract, which was based 
on the federal statute creating the bank, forms an original in-
gredient in every cause.171 
[A]t Marshalls death it could still be said, as in 1789, that 
the federal government was neither feeble nor of unlimited 
powers.172 The narrow holdings in decisions of the Marshall 
Court tended to be nationalistic, but not unjustifiably so. How-
ever, the Courts opinions more often than not suggested ex-
pansive constructions of federal power and corresponding limits 
on state authority. 
B. THE REHNQUIST COURTS TREATMENT OF FEDERALISM 
DECISIONS OF THE MARSHALL COURT: A STUDY 
How have the federalism decisions of the Marshall Court 
endured? I reviewed every federalism case decided by the Court 
since 1970, shortly before President Nixon appointed William 
H. Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, to assess how the Justices 
treated decisions of the Marshall Court. I compared the way in 
which the Justices who consistently voted to favor state auton-
 
 167. 14 U.S. at 33849; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. at 387, 391 (extending 
Martin to review of state criminal cases). Martin was not the first time that 
the Court invalidated a state law. It also did so six years earlier in Fletcher v. 
Peck, which invalidated a Georgia law under the Contracts Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). 
 168. 14 U.S. at 33031. For elaborations of Justice Storys theory, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1499, 150105 (1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional 
Limitations on Congress Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 3435 (1981). 
 169. Compare Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 100506 (1965) (arguing that Congress need not confer 
appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review decisions of state 
courts), with Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) 
(testing the limits of Wechslers argument). 
 170. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 82324 
(1824); Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 904, 90810 (1824). 
 171. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824. 
 172. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 194. 
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omy over federal authority173 reliedor chose not to relyon 
decisions of the Marshall Court with the way in which the con-
sistent dissenters in federalism cases174 treated those decisions. 
The study reveals that Justices in the federalism majority were 
substantially more likely to discount the nationalistic implica-
tions of Marshall Court decisionsor ignore them altogether
than were the Justices in the dissent, who were significantly 
more likely to urge fidelity to the spirit of Marshall Court deci-
sions. 
1. Preliminary Matters 
First, a note about scope. To review every federalism case 
decided by the Court since 1970,175 I needed a workable defini-
tion of federalism. Naturally, this required some arbitrary line 
drawing. The federalism cases that I considered exhibit the 
following characteristics: (1) they involved in a direct way176 
the extent of the power of the federal government or the state 
governments,177 or the boundary between federal and state 
 
 173. I have included the following Justices in this group: William 
Rehnquist, Sandra Day OConnor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Cla-
rence Thomas, and Lewis Powell. Throughout this Article, this group is re-
ferred to as the federalism majority or simply the majority. 
 174. I have included the following Justices in this group: David Souter, 
John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Harry Blackmun, 
Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, and Byron White. Throughout this Ar-
ticle, this group is referred to as the federalism dissent or simply the dis-
senters or the dissent. 
 175. Although I refer to the Rehnquist Court throughout this Article, it 
might seem technically more accurate to refer to the Rehnquist and Burger 
Courts, in light of the temporal range of the cases I considered. I have re-
frained from using that label, however, because my specific interest is in the 
Justices who served (for at least some time) after William Rehnquist became 
Chief Justice. The study, in other words, considers how the Justices of the 
Rehnquist Court treated decisions of the Marshall Court, but a more complete 
picture emerges when we include cases that involved those Justices but were 
decided before 1986. In any event, because federalism was Chief Justice 
Rehnquists signature issue, the bulk of cases relevant to the study were de-
cided after 1986. 
 176. Many cases indirectly involve the powers of the federal and state gov-
ernments or the boundary between federal and state power. To take but one 
obvious example, the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porated the protections of the Bill of Rights was in no small part a debate over 
federalismthat is, over whether the Constitution limited the powers of the 
state governments in the area of criminal procedure. Such cases turn on an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which I have mostly excluded 
from the study. See infra note 186. 
 177. I have also excluded several categories of cases that involve limits im-
posed by specific constitutional provisions on the respective powers of the state 
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power; and (2) they required for decision reference to (a) a pro-
vision of the Constitution as originally ratified, (b) the Tenth 
Amendment,178 (c) the Eleventh Amendment,179 or (d) a princi-
ple inferred from the structure of the Constitution. Under this 
definition, I reviewed cases involving state sovereign immu-
nity,180 Congresss power to regulate interstate commerce,181 
the dormant Commerce Clause,182 preemption,183 federal com-
mon law,184 abstention,185 and several other topics.186 
 
and federal governments, because those cases implicate structural principles 
or concerns over individual rights that transcend concerns over federalism. 
For example, I have not included cases involving the Bill of Attainder or Ex 
Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & § 10, cl. 1, or any of the 
other provisions in Article I, sections 9 and 10, even though those provisions 
expressly limit the powers of the state and federal governments. For the same 
reason, I have excluded habeas cases and cases that turn on interpretation of 
the Amendments (other than the Tenth) in the Bill of Rights. 
 178. Although the Tenth Amendment was not part of the Constitution as 
originally ratified, it confirmed the theory of enumerated powers, which the 
Constitutions proponents had offered to allay Anti-Federalist concerns about 
the breadth of the national governments power. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, 
SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 13 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 
339 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 327 (The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.). 
 179. Although the Eleventh Amendment, which Congress formally pro-
posed to the states for ratification in 1794, was not ratified until late 1797, see 
U.S. CONSTITUTION SESQUICENTENNIAL COMM., HISTORY OF THE FORMATION 
OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 63 (1941), the Court has held that it 
confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional 
principle; it follows that the scope of the States immunity from suit is demar-
cated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates 
implicit in the constitutional design. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 72829 
(1999). 
 180. These cases involve the scope of both state and federal authority. See, 
e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that states enjoy immunity from suit in 
their own courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Congress lacks power under Article I to authorize private suits against states 
in federal court). 
 181. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 182. The Court has long interpreted the affirmative grant of power to Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce to imply limits on the power of the 
states over interstate commerce. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 3442 (1824). 
 183. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; California v. ARC America Corp., 
490 U.S. 93, 10001 (1989). 
 184. Although limits on the power of the federal courts to develop common 
law often are phrased in terms of the separation of powers, the development of 
federal common law also raises federalism concerns because of the Supremacy 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
650 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:612 
 
As this brief statement about the scope of the study re-
veals, there is an uncomfortable imprecision in any attempt to 
draw conclusions from even a comprehensive consideration of 
Supreme Court federalism decisions. Even if the question of 
scope could be easily resolved, problems would still arise in an 
analysis of the Courts treatment of Marshall Court decisions. 
As will become evident, one cannot draw conclusions from the 
Courts treatment of precedent from the Marshall Court with-
out a careful consideration of context. It is one thing when the 
dissent relied heavily on a Marshall decision and the majority 
declined even to cite it; it is another when both the majority 
and the dissent relied on the same decision, each claiming that 
it supports its view of the original understanding. In the latter 
set of cases, I had to exercise judgment about how to character-
 
Clause. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996) (discussing constitutional and 
federalism questions raised by federal common law and suggesting that some 
federal common law rules are consistent with the Constitution but have been 
mischaracterized). 
 185. Judicial solicitude for Our Federalism, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 44 (1971), has led the Court to develop a complex doctrine in which federal 
courts abstain from hearing cases where necessary to promote the integrity of 
state law and respect the autonomy of state judicial bodies. 1 TRIBE, supra 
note 155, at 568; see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). 
 186. The most conspicuous absence from this list is the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which (along with the other Reconstruction Amendments) was 
intended to be a limitation[ ] of the power of the States and an enlargement[ ] 
of the power of Congress. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). I have 
excluded most Fourteenth Amendment cases because the Amendment was 
ratified more than thirty years after Marshall left the Court. In Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, the Court is concernedto the extent that its methodology 
is originalistwith the original understanding in 1868. See id. at 34445. This 
inquiry requires reference to the debates between the proponents and oppo-
nents of Reconstruction, and the Marshall Courts views are at best secon-
daryeven if the Court has borrowed the test from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819), in construing Congresss power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
32627 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 34546. However, I have in-
cluded those cases that involve the Fourteenth Amendment along with an in-
terpretation of the original Constitution or the Tenth or Eleventh Amend-
ments. Accordingly, I have included cases involving whether Congress has 
acted validly pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate 
the states sovereign immunity, because those cases also turn on an interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Amendment and the constitutional structure. See, e.g., 
Nev. Dept of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Conversely, I have 
not included cases involving Congresss Section 5 power when the question of 
abrogation was not at issue. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
2006] THE ORIGINALISTS DILEMMA 651 
 
ize the Justices treatment of the Marshall decision. Notwith-
standing the fact that subjective judgments sometimes crept 
into my analysis at the margins, on the whole it was not diffi-
cult to make objective judgments about the manner in which 
the Justices of the majority and the dissent in federalism cases 
since 1970 cited Marshall Court decisions.187 
2. Results 
My review of recent federalism cases reveals that the Jus-
tices who composed the federalism majority and the Justices 
who composed the dissenting voting bloc varied demonstrably 
in their treatment of important statements, explications, quali-
fiers, and outright dicta from Marshall decisions. The Justices 
who composed the federalism majority were significantly more 
likely than the dissenters to ignore altogether federalism deci-
sions of the Marshall Court. The dissenters, in contrast, were 
far more likely to premise arguments about the original under-
standing on Marshall Court decisions. When the Justices of the 
majority did use Marshall Court decisions, they were substan-
tially more likely than the dissenters to rely upon qualifying 
statements about the limited scope of federal authority. The 
dissenters, in contrast, were considerably more likely to rely on 
the more expansive nationalistic implications of Marshall 
Court decisions. 
Below, I summarize the results of the study by grouping 
recent federalism decisions by subject matter and comparing 
the ways in which the Justices in the competing federalism vot-
ing blocs cited, or did not cite, Marshall decisions. As a primer 
 
 187. When the Court in a unanimous decision cited a decision of the Mar-
shall Court, it is equally defensible to attribute the views cited to both the 
more conventional majority and dissenting blocs, or simply not to attribute 
them to either side. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 
716 (1996) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), for 
the proposition that the federal courts have a duty to exercise the jurisdiction 
conferred by Congress). I have chosen the latter path. I have also excluded the 
relatively rare cases in which the voting breakdown differs significantly from 
the conventional federalism voting pattern. For example, in Reeves, Inc. v. 
Stake, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist 
joined Justice Blackmuns opinion holding that South Dakotas policy of pre-
ferring in-state cement customers did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 447 U.S. 429, 44647 (1980). Justices Powell, Brennan, White, and 
Stevens dissented, noting that the need to ensure unrestricted trade among 
the [s]tates created a major impetus for the drafting of the Constitution. Id. 
at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
190 (1824)). 
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for the differences in how the competing blocs cited Marshall 
Court decisions, consider the way they treated Marbury in fed-
eralism cases. Marbury, which was not expressly a case about 
federalism, stands today for at least three important, general 
propositions: First, the Court has the power, and the obligation 
in appropriate cases, to review acts of Congress for constitu-
tionality.188 Second, there ought to be a legal remedy for every 
legal wrong.189 And third, the Court has authority to compel an 
official of the executive branch to perform a ministerial, legal 
duty.190 The Justices in the federalism majority cited Marbury 
in federalism cases to support the proposition that the Courts 
enjoy the power of judicial reviewspecifically, that the Courts 
retain a role in policing the boundary of the federal power.191 In 
contrast, the dissenters cited Marbury in state sovereign im-
munity cases for the proposition that a States violation of fed-
eral law, that is, a legal wrong, justifies congressional abroga-
tion of the States immunity from suitthat is, permits 
creation of a legal remedy.192 The Justices differential treat-
ment of Marbury is emblematic of the way in which they 
treated federalism decisions of the Marshall Court. 
a. Cases Addressing State Sovereign Immunity 
The most pronounced difference between the majoritys 
and the dissents treatment of Marshall decisions is in cases in-
 
 188. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 17680 (1803) (It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule.). 
 189. Id. at 16366 (The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.). Of course, there was no remedy for Mr. Marbury. Id. at 
16680. 
 190. Id. at 16668 ([W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and indi-
vidual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear 
that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the 
laws of his country for a remedy.) 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); id. at 575, 
579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 243 (1985); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority also cited Marburys more specific 
holding about the Courts jurisdiction under Article III to support the conclu-
sion that Congress cannot authorize the Court to hear suits against uncon-
senting States. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). 
 192. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 812 (1999) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
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volving state sovereign immunity. The difference is stark be-
cause, for the most part, the Justices in the majority did not 
cite Marshalls constructions of the Eleventh Amendment at 
all. The dissenters, in contrast, regularly relied on Marshalls 
account of the original understanding of both the Eleventh 
Amendment and Article III in contesting the majoritys inter-
pretation of the States immunity from suit. 
The Marshall Court discussion most relevant to recent dis-
putes about the scope of state sovereign immunity is in Cohens 
v. Virginia,193 in which Marshall provided a narrow account of 
the Eleventh Amendments application. Marshall explained 
that the Eleventh Amendments motive was not to maintain 
the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to at-
tend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the na-
tion, but rather was to bar from federal court a narrow class of 
private suits seeking to compel the States to satisfy their 
debts.194 He argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not oth-
erwise chang[e] the relations between the whole and its parts, 
as to strip the government of the means of protecting, by the 
instrumentality of its Courts, the [C]onstitution and laws from 
active violation.195 Marshall also argued explicitly that Article 
IIIs grant of judicial power over suits arising under federal law 
embraced all suits involving States, notwithstanding a States 
claim of sovereign immunity.196 However, Marshalls discussion 
on these controversial points was not necessary to the Courts 
narrower conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment did not 
preclude Supreme Court review of suits commenced by, rather 
than against, States.197 
Perhaps for this reason, the majority rarely cited Cohens in 
cases defining the scope of state sovereign immunity.198 In 
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transporta-
tion,199 Justice Brennan relied in his dissent on Cohenss ac-
 
 193. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 194. Id. at 40607. 
 195. Id. at 407. 
 196. Id. at 392. 
 197. Id. at 40512. 
 198. The majority did, however, rebuke the dissent for urging the Court to 
overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), in part because the Court in 
Hans had a much closer vantage point than the dissent for assessing the 
original meaning of the Constitution. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
69 (1996). 
 199. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
654 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:612 
 
count of the Eleventh Amendment.200 The majority took him to 
task for placing too much weight on Cohens, because the 
statements on which his dissent relied were unnecessary to 
the decision.201 In the more recent and important decisions in 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida202 and Alden v. Maine,203 the majority 
did not rely on the relevant passages in Cohens at all.204 
When the majority cited decisions of the Marshall Court in 
state sovereign immunity cases, it generally cited decisions 
that did not involve sovereign immunity. The majority, more-
over, typically either cited statements in those decisions that 
conceded limitations on federal authority, or relied on state-
ments in those decisions to imply decidedly less nationalistic 
consequences than other portions of the same opinions sug-
gest.205 In Alden, the Court cited Martin v. Hunters Lessee206
which held that the Court has power to review state judgments 
 
 200. Id. at 50709 & n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 482 n.11. Justice Powell also argued for the Court that Justice 
Brennan erroneously relied on dicta in United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 115 (1809), and Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 
(1828). Welch, 483 U.S. at 49192. 
 202. 517 U.S. at 76 (holding that Congress lacks power under Article I to 
abrogate the states sovereign immunity in federal court). 
 203. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks authority to abrogate 
the states sovereign immunity in state court). 
 204. The Court in Seminole Tribe did cite Cohens in a footnote, but it was 
solely to support the proposition that the Court is empowered to review a 
question of federal law arising from a state-court decision where a State has 
consented to suit. 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. Cohens did not address the question of 
state consent, although the case involved a suit commenced by a State. The 
only time the majority cited Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738 (1824), in a state sovereign immunity case was in Idaho v. Coeur 
dAlene Tribe, in which Justice Kennedy interpreted Osborn narrowly to sug-
gest that the Court would not have entertained the suit if a suit against the 
State had been available in a state forum. 521 U.S. 261, 272 (1997) ([I]f it was 
within the power of the plaintiff to make the State a party to the suit it would 
certainly [be] true that a suit against state officials would be barred, but if 
the real principal is exempt from all judicial process an officer suit could pro-
ceed. (alteration in original) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 84243)). 
Justice Souter disputed this reading in his dissent. 521 U.S. at 315 n.12 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 205. See Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur DAlene, Federal Courts and the Suprem-
acy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and 
Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 301, 321 (1998) (arguing that Chief Justices 
Marshall and Rehnquist had very different visionsof law . . . , of the impor-
tance of remedies against government officers for wrongs committed in their 
office, and of the relative roles of the state and federal courts in securing the 
supremacy of federal law). 
 206. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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and determine the constitutionality of state legislation,207 and 
suggested that state courts might not be adequate fora for the 
resolution of federal questions208for the general proposition 
that the federal government is limited by the doctrine of enu-
meration.209 The Court in Alden also cited McCulloch v. Mary-
land210 and Osborn, two decisions generally viewed as announc-
ing broad conceptions of federal power, for the proposition that 
the federal government lacks authority to act through instru-
mentalities of the States.211 Similarly, the Court in Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon212 cited Martin for the proposition 
that state judges are fully competent to adjudicate questions of 
federal law.213 However, the passage cited goes on to caution 
that with respect to the powers granted to the United States, 
state judges are not independent, and argues that Supreme 
Court review of state decisions is essential because of the risk 
that state judges might unintentionally transcend their au-
thority, or misconstrue the [C]onstitution.214 
On the other hand, the dissent in state sovereign immunity 
cases consistently cited both the Marshall Courts pronounce-
ments on the meaning of Article III and the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the Marshall Courts other decisions addressing the 
relationship between the state and federal governments. The 
dissenting Justices relied on Marshalls account in Cohens of 
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to demonstrate that it 
bars only suits premised on the Citizen-State Diversity Clause 
of Article III,215 that Hans was wrongly decided,216 and that the 
 
 207. Id. at 34344, 351. 
 208. Id. at 33435. 
 209. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 739 (1999). 
 210. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 211. Alden, 527 U.S. at 753. 
 212. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
 213. Id. at 238 n.2 (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 34144). 
 214. Martin, 14 U.S. at 344. 
 215. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 660 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 11213 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch v. Tex. Dept of 
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 508 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 296 n.51 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees of the 
Dept of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dept of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 
279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 216. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 45859 n.1 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), for the 
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable to citi-
zens suits against their own States). 
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protection of state dignity is an insufficient basis on which to 
construct a jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity.217 The 
dissenters cited Osborn for the same proposition,218 and Mar-
tin, McCulloch, and Gibbons v. Ogden219 for the proposition 
that the States are not sovereign, for purposes of immunity, 
with respect to obligations validly imposed by federal law.220 
The dissenters also relied squarely on other Marshall decisions 
in arguing that Article III did not incorporate the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity,221 that the Court should construe state 
immunity narrowly to allow a broad range of suits against state 
officers,222 and that the States do not enjoy the status of full 
sovereigns for purposes of immunity under the law of na-
tions.223 Justice Brennan summarized the dissenters views 
when he argued that the Marshall Courts decisions reflect a 
consistent understanding of the limited effect of the [Eleventh] 
Amendment on the structure of federal jurisdiction outside the 
state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses.224 
 
 217. Fed. Mar. Commn v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 770, 772 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 9697 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 218. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 113 (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch, 483 
U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 29798 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
 219. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 220. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 n.16, 800 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); Seminole Tribe, 517 
U.S. at 153 (Souter, J. dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 410); Welch, 
483 U.S. at 514 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 334
35); id. at 518 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 19697). 
 221. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (citing Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 
(1812)); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 41618 (1979) (same). 
 222. Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 315 n.12 (1997) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 843); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 
172 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738, and United States v. 
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809)); Will v. Mich. Dept of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 9293 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738, 
and Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 124 (1828)); Atascadero, 
473 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Madrazo, 26 U.S. 110; Peters, 
9 U.S. 115); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 143, 
148 n.32, 165 n.50 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 
738, Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806), and Little v. Barreme, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)). 
 223. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 500 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)). See generally Pe-
ter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 224. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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b. Cases Addressing the Scope of Congressional Authority 
In cases construing the scope of congressional power, the 
Justices in the majority regularly cited statements in Marshall 
Court decisions acknowledging that the federal government is a 
government of limited and enumerated powers. Those Justices 
also tended to cite the limiting language in Marshall decisions 
that otherwise announced broad interpretations of congres-
sional authority. The dissenters, in contrast, often cited the 
Marshall Courts more expansive constructions of Congresss 
power, and responded to the majoritys treatment of Marshall 
decisions by citing Marshalls narrow construction of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
Decisions of the Marshall Court often provided something 
for everyone, and cases construing Congresss affirmative pow-
ers were no exception. Although the Court in McCulloch and 
Gibbons offered expansive interpretations of congressional au-
thority, Chief Justice Marshall prefaced those discussions by 
conceding that the federal government is one of enumerated 
powers and may exercise only the powers granted to it.225 
The Justices in the majority generally cited only Marshalls 
limiting statements in those cases, not his statements about 
broad federal authority.226 Conversely, the dissenters tended to 
ignore Marshalls observations about the enumeration and fo-
cused instead on the statements defining federal power expan-
sively and construing the Tenth Amendment narrowly.227 
 
 225. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (The enumeration presupposes something not enumer-
ated . . . .). 
 226. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 93637 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 553, 566 (1995) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 18990, and McCulloch, 
17 U.S. at 316); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (OConnor, J., 
dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405); see also United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 616 n.7 (2000) ([T]hat those limits may not be mis-
taken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written (quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803))); Alden, 527 U.S. at 739 ([The federal 
government] can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the 
[C]onstitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly 
given, or given by necessary implication. (quoting Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
at 326)); Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Marbury, 5 
U.S. at 137). 
 227. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (cit-
ing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819), for the 
proposition that the Tenth Amendment merely confirms the enumeration); 
Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196, McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 40407, and Mar-
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Consider the Courts later decisions construing Congresss 
power to regulate interstate commerce, in which the majority 
and the dissent sparred over the implications of the decision in 
Gibbons. In holding that Congress had authority to license ves-
sels traveling between two states,228 the Court in Gibbons con-
ceded generally that the internal commerce of a state . . . may 
be considered as reserved for the state itself, but asserted that 
commerce among the states includes commerce conducted 
solely within a state if it extend[s] to or affect[s] other 
States.229 The federalism majority relied on Gibbonss limiting 
language,230 whereas the dissent cited Gibbonss broader impli-
cations for the scope of the commerce power.231 
The majority and dissent also differed in their treatment of 
Marshall Court decisions in considering whether there are lim-
its on federal authority implied by the constitutional structure. 
The Justices of the federalism majority relied on McCulloch for 
the proposition that the constitutional structure implies limits 
on the powers of the federal government,232 even though 
 
tin, 14 U.S. at 32425, for the proposition that nothing in the Tenth Amend-
ment constitutes a limitation on congressional exercise of powers delegated by 
the Constitution to Congress). 
 228. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 18990. 
 229. Id. at 194; see also id. (Commerce among the States, cannot stop at 
the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the inte-
rior.). 
 230. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553; id. at 59396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Gibbonss limiting language and offering a narrow construction of Gib-
bonss reference to commerce that extend[s] to or affect[s] other States); see 
also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 426, for 
the proposition that Congress cannot punish felonies generally). 
 231. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641, 64849 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 604, 609 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 61516, 631 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (citing 
Gibbons for the proposition that because the commerce power is plenary, 
states ceded immunity in the plan of convention for claims arising out of obli-
gations imposed by Congress under the commerce power). 
 232. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 75253 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424, for 
the proposition that Congress cannot direct the states to accomplish federal 
objectives); Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849, 85354 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing McCulloch for the proposition that the people of the various states re-
tained their separate political identities upon the ratification of the Constitu-
tion); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (OConnor, J., 
dissenting) (citing McCullochs observation that the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy, 17 U.S. at 431, for the proposition that [f]ederal taxation of 
state activities is inherently a threat to state sovereignty); Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Commn v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 795 n.34 (1982) (citing McCulloch, 
17 U.S. at 316, for the proposition that Congress cannot direct the state legis-
latures to act); Hall, 440 U.S. at 43334 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 
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McCulloch itself suggested that because the constitutional 
structure itself protects States, judicial protections are unnec-
essary.233 The dissenters, in contrast, cited McCulloch for the 
propositions that the federal government enjoys broad inciden-
tal powers234 and that there are implied limits on state author-
ity.235 The dissenters also consistently relied on statements in 
McCulloch and Gibbons236 that the only restraints on Con-
gresss power to regulate interstate commerce inhere in the po-
litical process.237 Similarly, the dissenters cited Cohens and 
Martin to support more general notions of federal suprem-
acy.238 
 
McCulloch for the proposition that when the Constitution is silent on an issue, 
the Court should look to the constitutional plan to determine questions of 
federalism; and later concluding that States have constitutional immunity 
from state-law suits in other states courts); cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 753 (citing 
Osborn for the proposition that there are limits to Congresss power to pursue 
federal objectives through the state courts). 
One notable exception is Justice Kennedys reliance on McCulloch in his 
concurring opinion in Term Limits, in which he rejected the argument that be-
cause the states ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power only 
through the states or by acting in their capacities as citizens of particular 
states. See 514 U.S. at 84041 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403). In Term Limits, of course, Justice Kennedy joined 
the frequent dissenters to create a new federalism majority. 
 233. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 43536. 
 234. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 942 nn.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Congress can compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory 
program; citing McCullochs broad definition of Congresss incidental author-
ity); Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 859, 86162 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 40506). 
 235. See infra notes 24449 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (The wisdom 
and the discretion of [C]ongress, their identity with the people, and the influ-
ence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many 
other instances . . . the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure 
them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often 
rely solely, in all representative governments.); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 43536 
(explaining why the States should not be immune from federal taxation even 
though the federal government is immune from state taxation). 
 237. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 64849 (2000) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197); Baker, 485 U.S. at 519 (citing 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 43536); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435); Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Commn, 456 U.S. at 754 n.18 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196); Hodel v. 
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 290 (1981) (citing 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196); Natl League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857, 86687 n.7, 
878 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197, and McCulloch, 
17 U.S. at 40506); cf. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 822 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 42829, for the theory of national popular sovereignty). 
 238. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
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c. Cases Addressing Limits on State Authority 
The Justices also offered starkly different accounts of the 
implications of Marshall Court decisions for the scope of the 
States power. The Justices of the federalism majority generally 
cited narrowing language in Marshall Court decisions to argue 
against limitations on state power. The dissenters, in contrast, 
robustly cited Marshall Court decisions to argue that the con-
stitutional text and structure impose meaningful limits on 
States authority. 
The difference is most starkly apparent in the dueling 
opinions in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,239 in which Jus-
tice Kennedy joined the four conventional dissenters in invali-
dating Arkansass attempt to impose term limits on federal 
representatives.240 Justice Thomass dissent is representative of 
the conventional federalism majoritys treatment of decisions of 
the Marshall Court with respect to limitations on state author-
ity. Justice Thomass premise was that the ultimate source of 
the Constitutions authority is the consent of the people of each 
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people 
of the Nation as a whole.241 He cited McCulloch for support, 
quoting Chief Justice Marshalls comment that [n]o political 
dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the 
lines which separate the States, and of compounding the 
American people into one common mass.242 Justice Thomas, 
 
527 U.S. 627, 660 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ([W]hen there is a conflict 
between a States interest and a federal right, it would be hazarding too much 
to assert, that the judicatures of the states will be exempt from the prejudices 
by which the legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute per-
fectly impartial tribunals. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 386 (1821))); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 120 (1996) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (same); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548 ([T]he sovereignty of the States 
is limited by the Constitution itself. . . . [F]or example, . . . [b]y providing for 
final review of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails the 
sovereign power of the States judiciaries to make authoritative determina-
tions of law. (citing Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816))); Fed. Energy Regulatory Commn, 456 U.S. at 76061 (rejecting the 
conclusion that would allow the States to disregard . . . the preeminent posi-
tion held by federal law throughout the Nation . . . . (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 
34041)). 
 239. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 240. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 241. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. at 849 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403); see also id. 
at 853 (McCulloch seemed to assume that the people had conferred on the 
general government the power contained in the [C]onstitution, and on the 
States the whole residuum of power. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
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however, rejected the more broadly nationalistic implications of 
the full passage in McCulloch from which the quote was 
drawn.243 
In contrast, Justice Stevenss opinion in Term Limits relied 
heavily on McCulloch for the proposition that the Constitution 
imposes implied limits on state authority. He argued that 
McCulloch demonstrates that the States reserved powers do 
not extend to those powers that the States never enjoyed, such 
as the power to create qualifications for federal representa-
tives.244 More important, Justice Stevenss opinion relied on 
McCulloch for a conception of national popular sovereignty: 
The Congress of the United States . . . is not a confederation of 
nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by ap-
pointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of represen-
tatives of the people.245 For support, Justice Stevens quoted 
Marshalls statement in McCulloch that [t]he government of 
the Union . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the 
people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its 
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on 
them, and for their benefit.246 
 
at 410)); cf. id. at 871 (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833), which held that the Fifth Amendments Takings 
Clause did not apply to the states, for the proposition that one should not 
lightly read [constitutional] provisions . . . as implicit deprivations of state 
power). 
 243. Id. at 849 n.2. The full passage in McCulloch, which Justice Kennedy 
cited in his concurrence, id. at 84041 (Kennedy, J., concurring), provides: 
The Convention which framed the [C]onstitution was indeed elected 
by the State legislatures. But the instrument . . . was submitted to 
the people. . . . It is true, they assembled in their several Statesand 
where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was 
ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate 
the States, and of compounding the American people into one common 
mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the 
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures 
of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State gov-
ernments. 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403. 
 244. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 796 n.12 (majority opinion) (explaining 
that McCulloch rejected the argument that the Constitutions silence on the 
subject of state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies that 
the states have reserved power to tax such federal instrumentalities (citing 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 430)). 
 245. Id. at 821. 
 246. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 40405). Similarly, Justice Stevens 
relied on McCulloch in arguing that permitting states to impose term limits on 
federal representatives would undermin[e] the uniformity and the national 
character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure, and sever the 
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This pattern largely held in preemption and dormant Com-
merce Clause cases, as well. Although the voting blocs did not 
always form as neatly in these categories of cases,247 in general 
the Justices of the federalism majority cited narrow language 
in Marshall Court decisions that suggest solicitude for state 
autonomy.248 Conversely, the dissenters cited the more nation-
alistic implications of Gibbons and other Marshall Court deci-
sions.249 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISM 
A. THE ORIGINALISTS DILEMMA 
In one sense, the demonstrable difference in the way that 
the Justices in the federalism majority and those in the federal-
ism dissent treated decisions of the Marshall Court is entirely 
unsurprising. After all, the Court routinely divided 5-4 in fed-
 
direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Govern-
ment and the people of the United States. 514 U.S. at 822 (Those means are 
not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of 
the legislature, . . . but by the people of all the States. They are given by all, 
for the benefit of alland upon theory, should be subjected to that government 
only which belongs to all. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 42829)). 
 247. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) 
(Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, OConnor, JJ. 
and joined in part by Scalia, J.) (upholding state regulation of corporate stock 
against preemption challenge). 
 248. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564, 613, 635 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying on Wilson v. Black-
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829), and Brown v. Mary-
land, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), in arguing that dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine is not an exclusive limitation of state autonomy); CTS Corp., 
481 U.S. at 89 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819), for the proposition that corporations are creatures of 
state law); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 340 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) to support his 
argument that the Court should reject a Commerce Clause challenge to a 
states prohibition on sales of minnows out of state). 
 249. See, e.g., Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 571 (citing Justice Johnsons 
concurrence in Gibbons for the proposition that commerce must be free from 
all invidious and partial restraints, 22 U.S. at 231); W. Lynn Creamery Inc. v. 
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994) (citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 419 (1827) as having an expansive view of the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it concluded that a burden placed at any point on the stream of 
commerce will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer); Hughes, 
441 U.S. at 326 & n.3 (Brennan, J.) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209, and Wil-
son, 27 U.S. at 245, as support for robust limitations on state regulation of 
commerce).  
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eralism cases.250 One would expect to find that the competing 
positions were informed by competing views of the original 
source material, including precedent. Viewed in the context of 
originalism, however, the difference in treatment of Marshall 
Court decisions suggests much more. 
In light of the original understanding of how constitutional 
ambiguities would be resolved, the Marshall Courts nationalis-
tic interpretations of the Constitution pose a potential dilemma 
for the modern originalistor at least for the modern original-
ist whose view of the original understanding relies heavily on 
the ratification-era statements of Anti-Federalists. As I demon-
strated recently, the Justices of the federalism majority regu-
larly cited Anti-Federalist concerns about the meaning of the 
Constitution in order to demonstrate that the delegates at the 
state ratification conventions would never have voted to ratify 
the Constitution unless it accommodated those concerns.251 
These Justices implicitly argued that although the Anti-
Federalists lost the war over whether the Constitution should 
be ratified, there is no reason to think that the Anti-Federalists 
lost every specific battle over how the various provisions of the 
Constitution should be understood.252 Accordingly, these Jus-
tices cited Anti-Federalist views to demonstrate that Anti-
Federalist hopes, and not fears, were realized upon ratifica-
tion.253 
The modern originalist who believes that Anti-Federalist 
views deserve equal time in the quest to determine the original 
understanding might, at least at first blush, be inclined to dis-
count the decisions of the Marshall Court. Decisions of the 
Marshall Court systematically ignored, at least implicitly in the 
course of their reasoning, the ratification-era views of the Anti-
Federalists. Indeed, Jeffersonian Republicansthe ideological 
heirs of the Anti-Federalistsreacted with revulsion to many 
of the Marshall Courts most important federalism decisions, 
denouncing them as unwarranted extensions of federal author-
ity or impermissible limitations on state authority.254 
 
 250. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Smith, supra note 18, at 25962; see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 71819, 72425 (1999); Welch v. Tex. Dept of Highways and Pub. 
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 252. Smith, supra note 18, at 259. 
 253. See id. at 25962. 
 254. The Judiciary of the United States, Jefferson wrote, is the subtle 
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Yet the modern originalist seems, even putting aside for a 
moment the doctrine of stare decisis, to be bound by originalism 
itself to accept the decisions of the Marshall Court, at least to 
the extent that they addressed questions that were left ob-
scure and equivocal255 upon ratification of the Constitution. 
The original understanding appears to have been that the an-
swers to questions left unresolved by the Constitution, or not 
anticipated at the time of ratification, would be fixed in the 
course of subsequent adjudications. According to the original 
understanding, the Marshall Courts resolution of such ques-
tions created fixed meaning where the original understanding 
was ambiguous, meaning by which the modern originalist is 
bound. 
Of course, an originalist who believes that the Constitution 
was not originally understood to confer broad power on the fed-
eral government can discount the nationalistic decisions of the 
Marshall Court on the ground that they are simply inconsistent 
with the original understanding.256 But to do so, the originalist 
must be able to assert that the questions resolved by the Mar-
shall Court were in fact not left obscure and equivocal257 by 
the Constitution, and that the Marshall Court simply answered 
them wrongly.258 The originalist who takes this view might still 
choose, as a matter of stare decisis, to follow decisions of the 
Marshall Court, but might not feel compelled to do so by 
originalism itself.259 
It is difficult even for the most confident originalist, how-
ever, to argue that the historical record provides clear answers 
to all of the contentious questions addressed by the Marshall 
Court, let alone that the Marshall Court answered them incor-
rectly. And the original understanding appears to demand the 
conclusion that the answers to those questions were fixed by 
the Marshall Courts decisions, even though the questions 
might have been resolved differently if the Chief Justice had 
 
corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine 
the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our [C]onstitu-
tion from a coordination of a general and special government to a general and 
supreme one alone. NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 322. Jefferson summed up 
the prevailing view among his partys faithful when he remarked, Nothing 
should be spared to eradicate this spirit of Marshallism. Id. at 146. 
 255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
 256. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861. 
 257. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229. 
 258. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 86162. 
 259. See Scalia, Response, supra note 108, at 13940. 
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been less nationalistic than John Marshall. Even the originalist 
who is skeptical of broad federal power thus may be compelled 
by originalism itself to accept the expansively nationalistic de-
cisions of the Marshall Court. 
The results of the study presented above suggest that the 
Justices in the federalism majority tended to follow what they 
discerned to be the original understanding, rather than the 
more expansive nationalistic implications of the Marshall 
Courts decisions. The Justices in the federalism dissent, in 
contrast, treated decisions of the Marshall Courtincluding 
their nationalistic implicationsas having established consti-
tutional meaning. In other words, the Justices in the majority 
reacted to the dilemma by preferring their own account of the 
original understanding to that of the Marshall Court. In con-
trast, the Justices in the dissent did not face a dilemma, be-
cause they treated the Marshall Courts views and the original 
understanding as one and the same. 
B. CONSEQUENCES 
What consequences for originalism follow from the major-
itys and the dissents differential treatment of decisions of the 
Marshall Court? First, the results of the study presented above 
demonstrate that the Justices, while professing fidelity to the 
principles of originalism, did not robustly, or at least consis-
tently, adhere to the original understanding of how constitu-
tional ambiguities would attain fixed meaning through adjudi-
cation. Second and more important, the study suggests that one 
of the principal justifications for originalismthat it will con-
strain the discretion of judges to impose their own views in the 
course of decision makingmight not be accurate as a descrip-
tive matter. By relying, explicitly or implicitly, on the vague 
distinction between holdings and dicta to temper (or invigorate) 
the doctrine of constitutional ambiguities, a Justice can ignore 
(or accept) pronouncements of the Marshall Court according to 
how well they correspond to the Justices own conception of the 
original understanding or to the Justices own instrumentalist 
goals. 
Before elaborating on these themes, a few preliminary 
thoughts are in order. I do not insist that the Marshall Court 
correctly answered every question that it addressed, either as a 
matter of the original understanding or according to some other 
methodology of constitutional interpretation. Nor do I insist 
that the Justices on the Rehnquist Court expressly or consis-
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tently professed fidelity to the account provided above of the 
original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would 
be resolved, although other proponents of originalism have.260 
Furthermore, I do not claim that the Court ought to adhere 
particularly closely to the decisions (and the reasoning) of the 
Marshall Court simply because Madison and others apparently 
believed that the Court would play a special role in fixing the 
meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions. What is im-
portant for present purposes is that all of the Justices appeared 
to accept some form of originalism as the appropriate constitu-
tional methodology in federalism cases. To the extent that they 
professed fidelity to a relatively strict version of originalism,261 
the Justices own constitutional methodology required adher-
ence to all original understandings. Originalism in its strict 
form does not condone following the original understanding 
with respect to some matters and not with respect to others; 
the originalist must take the bitter with the sweet. In light of 
the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities 
would be resolved, the Justices treatment of Marshall Court 
decisions tells us something about their fidelity to originalism, 
and about originalism itself. 
 
 
 260. See Nelson, supra note 6. At a minimum, the Justices who frequently 
dissent in federalism cases do not accept the theory of liquidation in cases ad-
dressing the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, choosing instead a 
nonoriginalist approach to construing its meaning. Compare United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that exclusion of women from a public 
military academy violates the Fourteenth Amendment), with RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20245 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that the Four-
teenth Amendment as originally understood does not prohibit gender classifi-
cations). The Justices of the majority have not explicitly embraced the theory 
either, although Justice Scalia recently offered something like Madisons the-
ory of liquidation as a guide for interpreting the scope of Congresss power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
86264 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to adhere to the Courts twen-
tieth-century decisions expansively construing Congresss Section 5 power in 
contexts other than racial discrimination, with respect to which the Court 
gave the provision a more expansive scope . . . from the beginning (citing 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873)). 
 261. According to the strict form of originalism, the Constitution derives 
its authority from its ratification during particular periods in American his-
tory. Under this view, any departure from the understandings of those dis-
crete periods robs constitutional interpretation of its claim to legitimacy. 
Dorf, supra note 30, at 1766. Dorf argues that Raoul Berger is the strictest 
originalist among originalisms prominent proponents, and he cites Justice 
Scalias writings, as well. See id. at 1766 nn.2 & 3. 
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1. Fidelity to the Original Understanding of How 
Constitutional Ambiguities Would Be Resolved 
Proponents and opponents of the ratification agreed that 
questions left ambiguous by the Constitution would attain fixed 
meaning through the process of construction. Madison, Hamil-
ton, Brutus, and the others who offered this view appeared to 
have had in mind something more than simply importing to 
constitutional adjudication the doctrine of stare decisis. That 
doctrine, after all, permits a Court to overrule prior precedent 
after considering a series of prudential and pragmatic consid-
erations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior 
decision with the ideal of the rule of law.262 In the Framers 
view, however, constitutional meaning, once resolved, would 
remain fixed, subject only to the amendment process.263 Even to 
the extent that the Framers envisioned that judicial construc-
tions of the Constitution would be subject to ongoing revision 
according to the common-law method of adjudication, they do 
not appear to have anticipated significant evolution of constitu-
tional meaning over time.264 
In practice, however, the Court has, from its very earliest 
days, treated decisions addressing constitutional meaning as 
subject to judicial revision. Indeed, the Court has often made 
clear that it will not adhere to stare decisis as rigidly in cases 
involving constitutional interpretation, because, unlike deci-
sions involving statutory interpretation, Congress is not free to 
alter the Courts constitutional decisions.265 Marshall himself is 
notorious for his general hostility to precedent,266 although of 
course there was much less of it when he wrote his opinions for 
the Court. More important, the Court has not always followed 
strict originalism in determining constitutional meaning, and 
 
 262. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 85455 (1992). 
 263. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 60, at 160 (remarks of Edmund Randolph 
at the Virginia Ratifying Convention) (acknowledging that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is ambiguous and that the ambiguity may injure the states, 
but arguing that if the ambiguities are not properly explain[ed] by Congress, 
then the states can combine in order to insist on amending the ambiguities); 
Nelson, supra note 6, at 52647 (discussing the notion of fixed meaning). 
 264. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 77, at 514 (remarks of Rep. James 
Madison, June 17, 1789) (stating that the determination of the scope of the 
Presidents power to remove an executive officer will become the permanent 
exposition of the Constitution). 
 265. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 17273 
(1989). 
 266. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196. 
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thus has not always faithfully adhered to the original theory of 
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved.267 
Today, however, originalism is ascendant on the Court, at 
least in federalism cases. One would expect to find that 
originalist Justices follow not only the original understanding 
of constitutional provisions, but also the original understanding 
of the manner in which constitutional ambiguities would be re-
solved.268 Accordingly, one would also expect to find that the 
most faithful originalist Justices hew most closely to the Mar-
shall Courts pronouncements on the scope of federal and state 
power. After all, the Marshall Court offered the first construc-
tions of some of the most important questions left unresolved 
by the text of the Constitution. 
This has not been the case. As the discussion above demon-
strates,269 the Justices who most often sided with the States in 
federalism disputes were substantially more likely than the 
 
 267. Marshalls participation in the ratification debates almost certainly 
informed his decisions for the Court. Although his approach to constitutional 
interpretation was generally consistent with modern originalism, Friedman & 
Smith, supra note 29, at 11 & n. 25, his decisions rarely phrased the inquiry in 
those terms. Originalism formally came under attack around the time of the 
Civil War and in the years that followed it, as the Court construed the Civil 
War Amendments and their affect on the balance between federal and state 
authority. See SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 55 
(photo reprint 1969) (1862); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 150 (1890). Originalism and the notion 
that the Constitutions meaning could evolve competed for the Courts devotion 
during the period between Reconstruction and the New Deal. Compare Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 
(1936), and Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (originalist), with Home 
Building & Loan Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (nonoriginalist). After the New Deal, critics alter-
nately accused the Warren Court of ignoring the original meaning of the Con-
stitution, see, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 703 (1976), and of relying on it but misapplying it, see, 
e.g., Kelly, supra note 36, at 13637, and the Warren Courts perceived ex-
cesses led to the rise of the modern originalists. 
 268. Indeed, originalists have relied on Madisons theory of liquidation to 
reconcile originalism with the reality of the Constitutions indeterminacy. See 
supra notes 4344 and accompanying text; Nelson, supra note 6, at 52339. 
The account offered here of the original understanding of how constitutional 
ambiguities would be resolved also helps to explain why stare decisis is not 
inconsistent with originalism. In any event, prominent originalists accept the 
doctrine of stare decisis as an established, and perhaps necessary, feature of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 108, at 
13839; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861 ([A]lmost every originalist 
would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .). 
 269. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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dissenters to ignore federalism decisions of the Marshall Court 
or to discount their more aggressively nationalistic implica-
tions. Among those Justices are the members of the Court who 
were the most ardent proponents of originalism as a methodol-
ogy of constitutional interpretation, including Justice Scalia,270 
Justice Rehnquist,271 and Justice Thomas.272 For these original-
ists, the decisions of the Marshall Court apparently posed a di-
lemma: either discount the significance of Marshall Court opin-
ions in order to declare an original understanding that is more 
solicitous of the views of framing-era opponents of the Consti-
tution, or accept the nationalist implications of Marshall Court 
decisions, thus remaining faithful to the original understanding 
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. The for-
mer choice risks infidelity to the original understanding of how 
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, while the latter 
risks undervaluing the views of Anti-Federalists in the quest to 
define the original understanding. The results of the study pre-
sented here suggest that these Justices chose the former path. 
It would be too strong to suggest that these Justices in ef-
fect were unfaithful to originalismspecifically, to the original 
understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be re-
solvedby declining to accord dispositive weight to decisions of 
the Marshall Court. After all, all of the Justices of the federal-
ism majority appeared to accept the core holdings of most Mar-
shall decisions. Arguably, the Madisonian theory of how consti-
tutional ambiguities would be resolved requires adherence only 
to holdings, which, according to the Anglo-American tradition, 
are the only judicial determinations that have binding force
and thus fix meaning. Dicta has never been binding, either as 
a matter of stare decisis or according to Madisons theory of 
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. If it were, in-
strumentalist judges would regularly reach out to decide issues 
that are not necessary to the resolution of the cases before 
them. Because many of Marshalls most expansive construc-
tions of federal power were dicta, the modern originalist can 
 
 270. See, e.g., Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17; Scalia, Original-
ism, supra note 16. 
 271. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 267. 
 272. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (urging a return to an interpretation [of the Commerce Clause] 
better rooted in the Clauses original understanding); Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (urging abandonment of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
and fidelity to original understanding). 
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contend that those constructions may be safely ignoredif in 
fact they otherwise seem inconsistent with the original under-
standing, constitutional structure, or some other source of con-
stitutional meaningwhile maintaining fidelity to the original 
understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be re-
solved. 
Yet this account of the federalism majoritys treatment of 
decisions of the Marshall Court is unsatisfying, for several rea-
sons. First, as explained above, the distinction between hold-
ings and dicta is notoriously indeterminate.273 Permitting 
judges to ignore, based on this distinction, important pro-
nouncements about constitutional meaning by a Court with a 
historically close vantage point on the original understanding 
invites the very type of instrumentalist decision making that 
proponents of originalism claim the methodology is likely to 
prevent. As Professor Dorf explained, a too-narrow view of 
holdings often serves as a means by which judges evade prece-
dents that cannot fairly be distinguished.274 A judge who dis-
agrees with the substantive implications of a relevant state-
ment in a Marshall Court decision can easily insist that the 
statement is mere dicta and decline to follow it purely on in-
strumentalist grounds. 
Second, this account ignores the role that Marshall Court 
decisions played in the early Republic. Marshall may well have 
seldom missed the opportunity to rest a decision on two or 
three grounds when one would have sufficed, . . . to pick the 
more difficult ground for decision, . . . or to pass on issues not 
necessarily presented . . . .275 But given the political and legal 
context in which he operated, as well as his uncanny ability to 
gauge in advance the limits of what would be politically accept-
able, his decisions effectively answered many more questions 
than simply those narrowly presented. The political and legal 
culture generally responded by treating those questions as hav-
ing been answered. Indeed, as Neal Katyal has argued, dicta 
often serves the role of advicegiving to political branches;276 
although they need not follow it, it can be influential in setting 
expectations about what is constitutionally acceptable. This 
was particularly true during Marshalls tenure on the Court 
 
 273. See supra notes 11119 and accompanying text. 
 274. Dorf, supra note 112, at 1999. 
 275. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 197. 
 276. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 109, 
1801 (1998). 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
2006] THE ORIGINALISTS DILEMMA 671 
 
because so many fundamental questions about the separation 
of powersboth horizontal and verticalwere still unresolved 
or disputed, and even Marshalls contemporaneous detractors 
often recognized that his dicta had special force. 
After the decision in Cohens, for example, Jefferson wrote a 
letter to Justice William Johnson and James Madison com-
plaining about Marshalls view of federalism and of the power 
of the Court.277 Jefferson suggested that disputes between a 
State and the federal government should be resolved by an ap-
peal to an ultimate arbiter [of] the people of the Union, assem-
bled by their deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or 
of two-thirds of the States.278 Madison, who had been sympa-
thetic to Jeffersons views since at least the Virginia and Ken-
tucky resolutions,279 made clear in his response that he agreed 
with Jeffersons view of Marshalls tenure.280 He complained 
that the Judiciary career has not corresponded with what was 
anticipated, particularly in light of the Marshall Courts pro-
pensity to enlarge the general authority in derogation of the lo-
cal, and to amplify its own jurisdiction through extrajudicial 
reasons [and] dicta.281 Madison disagreed with Jeffersons pro-
posed solution, however, suggesting instead that if any remedy 
were necessary, a constitutional amendment would make more 
sense.282 Madison, in other words, was prepared to accept that 
Marshalls expansive constructions of the Constitutioneven 
those announced extrajudicial[ly] or via dictaeffectively 
fixed the meaning of the Constitution, and were correctable 
only through the amendment process.283 
 
 
 277. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (June 12, 
1823), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1469, 147277 (Merrill D. 
Peterson ed., 1984). 
 278. Id. at 1476. 
 279. See supra note 127. 
 280. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), re-
printed in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 798, 798802 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 
1999). 
 281. Id. at 802; see also THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PO-
LITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 358 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981) (noting 
that Madison bemoaned Marshalls latitudinary mode of expounding the Con-
stitution in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
 282. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 280, at 
802. 
 283. See NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 325 (stating that Madison had come 
to believe that disputed constitutional interpretation on major issues should 
be settled by constitutional amendment, not judicial decisions). 
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Similarly, the decision in McCulloch did much more than 
simply hold that Congress had power to create a national bank, 
that Congresss incidental powers under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause are broad, and that the States lack power to tax 
an instrumentality of the federal government, although these 
three holdings alone had explosive implications for federal-
state relations. Marshalls decision in McCulloch also embraced 
a conception of national popular sovereignty,284 and in the proc-
ess validated the conception of federal power that Hamilton 
had offered over Jeffersons objection two decades earlier.285 
This is not to suggest that all of John Marshalls pro-
nouncements immediately fixed the Constitutions meaning. 
Marshall himself did not always feel bound by his prior pro-
nouncements,286 and he offered the classic statement of why 
dicta should not bind future courts.287 But it is to suggest that 
the Marshall Courts decisions are entitled to substantial defer-
ence. The Marshall Court had the occasion to address thorny 
questions of first impression about the respective powers of the 
federal and state governmentsand, unlike on later Courts, 
the Justices own memories bridged the temporal distance be-
tween the Founding and the case at hand.288 Indeed, outside of 
the federalism context, the Court has long treated Marshall 
dicta as authoritative. For example, Marbury stands today for 
much more than its holdings about the constitutionality of the 
Judiciary Act, the scope of Article IIIs original jurisdiction pro-
vision, and the Courts power of judicial review. The Court has 
repeatedly cited it for the proposition that where there is a 
right there is a remedy,289 even though the Courts statement
the government will cease to deserve the high appellation of 
a government of laws, and not of men, if the laws furnish no 
 
 284. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) 
(Those powers are not given by the people of a single state. They are given by 
the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in pursu-
ance of the [C]onstitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the peo-
ple of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over 
them.). 
 285. See supra notes 12327 and accompanying text. 
 286. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196 (His disdain for 
precedent in general was extraordinary, even when it squarely supported 
him . . . .). 
 287. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 288. Friedman & Smith, supra note 29, at 11. 
 289. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 
(1992); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). 
P_SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM 
2006] THE ORIGINALISTS DILEMMA 673 
 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right290was dicta 
under any definition of the term.291 
Third, contending that the Justices in the majority justi-
fiably ignored only dicta rings hollow when one considers that 
they occasionally gave substantial deference to dicta from Mar-
shall Court federalism decisions. Such deference was applied 
when the dicta tended to buttress the account of the original 
understanding that the Justices otherwise sought to defend. 
For example, in United States v. Morrison, in asserting that 
Congress largely lacks power to regulate and punish interstate 
violence, Chief Justice Rehnquists opinion for the Court relied 
on Marshalls statement in Cohens v. Virginia that Congress 
has no general right to punish murder committed within any 
of the States or to punish felonies generally.292 The Justices 
in the federalism majority declined to rely on Cohenss pro-
nouncements about the scope of the States sovereign immu-
nity, however, on the ground that they are dicta.293 Similarly, 
the majority regularly cited Marshalls statements in Gibbons 
v. Ogden and McCulloch v. Maryland that Congresss powers 
are limited by the enumeration,294 even though the majority 
declined to rely on Marshalls broader statements in those deci-
sions about the scope of federal authority.295 The majority also 
 
 290. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 291. Marshalls statements about the rule of law were not necessary to the 
decision in Marbury in light of the Courts conclusion that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the suit. Id. at 173, 180. The statements also were not part of the ra-
tionale of the holding about the Courts jurisdiction. See Dorf, supra note 112, 
at 200509, 204048 (discussing different definitions of dicta, including the 
facts-and-outcomes definition and the rationale-based definition). 
 292. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (quoting Cohens 
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426, 428 (1821)). These statements are 
dicta both under the facts-and-outcomes approach and the rationale-focused 
approach. See supra notes 11019 and accompanying text. The Court held that 
it had jurisdiction because an Act of Congress authorizing the government in 
the District of Columbia was a law[] of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 436. The Court made its 
comments about Congresss power in the course of addressing the hypothetical 
question whether Congress had authority to pass laws that operate outside of 
the District of Columbia; although the Court suggested that Congress has 
such authority if it is necessary to complete and effectuate execution, it did 
not have to resolve the question, in light of its conclusion that Congress had 
not in fact attempted to authorize the sale of lottery tickets in Virginia. Id. at 
42330, 44048. 
 293. Welch v. Tex. Dept of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,. 482 
n.11 (1987); see supra notes 199201 and accompanying text. 
 294. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553, 566 (1995). 
 295. See supra notes 22531 and accompanying text. 
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cited, with much greater frequency than the dissent, dicta from 
decisions of the Taney and Chase Courts, which were more so-
licitous of claims of States rights, to support an originalist ac-
count favoring state autonomy.296 
Fourth, in discerning the original understanding, the Court 
gave deference to acts (or inaction) of the earliest Congresses, 
both according to the theory of liquidation of constitutional am-
biguities and because many of the members of the early Con-
gresses were Framers themselves. As Justice Scalia explained, 
not only do early congressional enactments provid[e] contem-
poraneous and weighty evidence of the Constitutions mean-
ing,297 but such contemporaneous legislative exposition of the 
Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes 
the construction to be given its provisions.298 Although Mar-
shall was not the first Chief Justice and not all of his colleagues 
during his long tenure on the Court had participated directly in 
the framing and ratification of the Constitution, Marshall was 
a central figure at the Virginia ratification convention, and his 
Courts decisions, like those of the early Congresses, reflect the 
accumulated wisdom of the framing era. Accordingly, dicta in 
Marshall Court decisions are perhaps entitled to greater weight 
than dicta from other courts. 
2. Originalisms Judicial-Constraint Defense 
The majoritys and the dissents differential treatment of 
decisions of the Marshall Court together undermine one of the 
principal justifications for originalism. Proponents argue that 
originalism is the most effective interpretive methodology at 
constraining the discretion of judges to impose their own views 
in the course of decision making.299 According to the judicial-
constraint defense, because originalism, unlike other ap-
proaches that treat constitutional meaning as subject to evolv-
ing, extra-textual norms, fixes the meaning of a constitutional 
provision according to the original understanding of that provi-
 
 296. My data shows that the Justices in the federalism majority are about 
four times more likely than the dissenting Justices to cite casesand particu-
larly pro-states rights dicta in casessuch as Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 
How.) 527 (1858), Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868), Lane County v. 
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 
113 (1870). 
 297. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 72324 (1986) (alteration in original)). 
 298. Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)). 
 299. See supra notes 3236 and accompanying text. 
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sion, judges cannot impose their own views under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation. The substantial difference be-
tween the majoritys and the dissents treatment of decisions of 
the Marshall Court suggests, however, either that the theory of 
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved is inherently 
malleable or that originalism in fact has not constrained the 
ability of the Justices to decide federalism cases based on their 
own (albeit genuinely held) normative views of the appropriate 
balance of federal and state authority. 
As explained above, the originalist can justify the decision 
to discount decisions of the Marshall Court by relying on the 
distinction between holdings and dicta. But this justification 
not only casts doubt on whether the Court is being faithful to 
the Framers understanding of how ambiguous constitutional 
provisions would attain fixed meaning, but also suggests that 
the judicial-constraint defense of originalism is overstated. The 
study demonstrates that there is a substantial risk that a Jus-
tice will decide whether to follow pronouncements of the Mar-
shall Court according to how well they correspond to the Jus-
tices own conception of the original understanding or to the 
Justices own instrumentalist goals. 
I do not mean to suggest that the Justices in the majority 
or the dissent did in fact decide whether to ignore, discount, or 
embrace pronouncements of the Marshall Court as part of an 
instrumentalist attempt to advance their personal views of the 
appropriate balance between federal and state power.300 But 
the results of the study need only be consistent with such an ac-
count to undermine the judicial constraint defense of original-
ism. The Justices differential treatment of decisions of the 
Marshall Court demonstrates that judges have vast discretion 
in choosing which sources to rely on when reconstructing the 
 
 300. Others, however, have leveled a similar charge, at least against the 
majority. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitutions Forgotten Cover Letter: An 
Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 615, 645 (1995) (In essence, the New Federalists seem to view the Con-
stitution almost as if it was a compromise between those who drafted it and 
their opponents.); Jackson, supra note 205, at 31824 (wondering whether 
the early 19th century vision of the Marshall Court does not commend itself 
more to the world of today than does the vision of federal judicial power re-
cently advanced in the Rehnquist Court); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest 
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 67581 (1993) (arguing 
that Justice OConnors view of federalism in New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992), parallels the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals in 
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815), which was reversed by Martin v. 
Hunters Lessee). 
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original understanding, and thus suggests that originalisms 
advantage over other approaches to constitutional interpreta-
tion in its ability to constrain judicial discretion is marginal. 
To be sure, it may be the case that a theoretically princi-
pled application of originalism not only permits but requires 
that the court be free from the constraint of precedent at least 
to some degree. That is, even if one does not accept Lawsons 
view that a court always must prefer the original understand-
ing to a prior judicial decision inconsistent with that under-
standing,301 one might argue that fidelity to the original under-
standing at least permits a court to depart from precedent that 
lacks a foundation in the original understanding. This view 
might justify the federalism majoritys choice to ignore Mar-
shall Court decisions construing the extent of the States con-
stitutional immunity from suit. But even on this view, it is far 
from clear that originalism would be particularly effective at 
curbing instrumentalism, let alone at promoting the values of 
consistency and stability in the law. Permitting judges to ig-
nore precedents that they deem sufficiently inconsistent with 
their understanding of the original understanding would ap-
pear, if anything, to invite judicial instrumentalism, not to 
limit it. 
This is also not to suggest that other methodologies for in-
terpreting the Constitution are more effective than originalism 
at constraining judicial instrumentalism. But neither is 
originalism the panacea for instrumentalism that its propo-
nents often claim, and the study presented here suggests that 
those claims should not, alone, stand in the way of the devel-
opment of other defensible interpretive methodologies. 
CONCLUSION 
On the 200th anniversary of the appointment of John Mar-
shall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist gave a speech in which he praised Marshall as a 
splendid gift to the American people.302 Rehnquist praised 
Marshalls success, which he achieved even though he faced a 
built-in headwind against his views for the first twenty-four 
years of his tenure as Chief Justice because Presidents Jeffer-
son, Madison, and Monroe had quite a different view of the re-
 
 301. See supra notes 10203 and accompanying text. 
 302. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks (May 8, 2001), http://www 
.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-08-01.html. 
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lationship between the federal and state governments than 
Marshall did.303 Chief Justice Rehnquists federalism deci-
sionsand those of the voting bloc he leddo not, however, 
demonstrate quite the same level of fondness for decisions of 
the Marshall Court. 
John Marshall may often have gotten it wrong, and he is 
certainly not above the charge that he was an instrumentalist 
Justice, taking every opportunity to fix constitutional meaning 
according to his view of the appropriate balance between fed-
eral and authority. But the modern originalisteven the 
originalist who does not generally share Marshalls view of the 
original understandingought to take the bitter with the 
sweet. If the original understanding was that constitutional 
ambiguities would attain fixed meaning in judicial decisions, 
then the modern originalist appears bound by originalism to 
accept some range of decisions of the Marshall Court, however 
much they may have demonstrated a preference for federal su-
premacy over state autonomy. That many modern originalists 
do not feel so boundand that they may choose not to feel so 
boundsuggests that originalisms promise as a constraint on 
judicial instrumentalism remains unfulfilled. 
 
 303. Id. 
